BOOK II
ON THE THEORY OF WAR
CHAPTER I - Branches of the Art
of War
War in its literal meaning is fighting, for
fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold activity which in a
wide sense is called War. But fighting is a trial of strength of the moral and
physical forces by means of the latter. That the moral cannot be omitted is
evident of itself, for the condition of the mind has always the most decisive
influence on the forces employed in War.
The necessity of fighting very soon led men to
special inventions to turn the advantage in it in their own favour: in
consequence of these the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations; but
in whatever way it is conducted its conception remains unaltered, and fighting
is that which constitutes War.
The inventions have been from the first weapons
and equipments for the individual combatants. These have to be provided and the
use of them learnt before the War begins. They are made suitable to the nature
of the fighting, consequently are ruled by it; but plainly the activity engaged
in these appliances is a different thing from the fight itself; it is only the
preparation for the combat, not the conduct of the same. That arming and
equipping are not essential to the conception of fighting is plain, because
mere wrestling is also fighting.
Fighting has determined everything appertaining to
arms and equipment, and these in turn modify the mode of fighting; there is,
therefore, a reciprocity of action between the two.
Nevertheless, the fight itself remains still an
entirely special activity, more particularly because it moves in an entirely
special element, namely, in the element of danger.
If, then, there is anywhere a necessity for
drawing a line between two different activities, it is here; and in order to
see clearly the importance of this idea, we need only just to call to mind how
often eminent personal fitness in one field has turned out nothing but the most
useless pedantry in the other.
It is also in no way difficult to separate in idea
the one activity from the other, if we look at the combatant forces fully armed
and equipped as a given means, the profitable use of which requires nothing
more than a knowledge of their general results.
The Art of War is therefore, in its proper sense,
the art of making use of the given means in fighting, and we cannot give it a
better name than the “Conduct of War.” On the other hand, in a wider sense all
activities which have their existence on account of War, therefore the whole
creation of troops, that is levying them, arming, equipping, and exercising
them, belong to the Art of War.
To make a sound theory it is most essential to separate
these two activities, for it is easy to see that if every act of War is to
begin with the preparation of military forces, and to presuppose forces so
organised as a primary condition for conducting War, that theory will only be
applicable in the few cases to which the force available happens to be exactly
suited. If, on the other hand, we wish to have a theory which shall suit most
cases, and will not be wholly useless in any case, it must be founded on those
means which are in most general use, and in respect to these only on the actual
results springing from them.
The conduct of War is, therefore, the formation
and conduct of the fighting. If this fighting was a single act, there would be
no necessity for any further subdivision, but the fight is composed of a
greater or less number of single acts, complete in themselves, which we call
combats, as we have shown in the first chapter of the first book, and which
form new units. From this arises the totally different activities, that of the
formation and conduct of these single combats in themselves, and the
combination of them with one another, with a view to the ultimate object of the
War. The first is called tactics, the other strategy.
This division into tactics and strategy is now in
almost general use, and every one knows tolerably well under which head to
place any single fact, without knowing very distinctly the grounds on which the
classification is founded. But when such divisions are blindly adhered to in
practice, they must have some deep root. We have searched for this root, and we
might say that it is just the usage of the majority which has brought us to it.
On the other hand, we look upon the arbitrary, unnatural definitions of these
conceptions sought to be established by some writers as not in accordance with
the general usage of the terms.
According to our classification, therefore,
tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the
theory of the use of combats for the object of the War.
The way in which the conception of a single, or
independent combat, is more closely determined, the conditions to which this
unit is attached, we shall only be able to explain clearly when we consider the
combat; we must content ourselves for the present with saying that in relation
to space, therefore in combats taking place at the same time, the unit reaches
just as far as personal command reaches; but in regard to time, and therefore
in relation to combats which follow each other in close succession, it reaches
to the moment when the crisis which takes place in every combat is entirely
passed.
That doubtful cases may occur, cases, for
instance, in which several combats may perhaps be regarded also as a single
one, will not overthrow the ground of distinction we have adopted, for the same
is the case with all grounds of distinction of real things which are
differentiated by a gradually diminishing scale. There may, therefore,
certainly be acts of activity in War which, without any alteration in the point
of view, may just as well be counted strategic as tactical; for example, very
extended positions resembling a chain of posts, the preparations for the
passage of a river at several points, &c.
Our classification reaches and covers only the use
of the military force. But now there are in War a number of activities which
are subservient to it, and still are quite different from it; sometimes closely
allied, sometimes less near in their affinity. All these activities relate to
the maintenance of the military force. In the same way as its creation and
training precede its use, so its maintenance is always a necessary condition.
But, strictly viewed, all activities thus connected with it are always to be
regarded only as preparations for fighting; they are certainly nothing more than
activities which are very close to the action, so that they run through the
hostile act alternate in importance with the use of the forces. We have
therefore a right to exclude them as well as the other preparatory activities
from the Art of War in its restricted sense, from the conduct of War properly
so called; and we are obliged to do so if we would comply with the first
principle of all theory, the elimination of all heterogeneous elements. Who
would include in the real “conduct of War” the whole litany of subsistence and
administration, because it is admitted to stand in constant reciprocal action
with the use of the troops, but is something essentially different from it?
We have said, in the third chapter of our first
book, that as the fight or combat is the only directly effective activity,
therefore the threads of all others, as they end in it, are included in it. By
this we meant to say that to all others an object was thereby appointed which,
in accordance with the laws peculiar to themselves, they must seek to attain.
Here we must go a little closer into this subject.
The subjects which constitute the activities
outside of the combat are of various kinds.
The one part belongs, in one respect, to the
combat itself, is identical with it, whilst it serves in another respect for
the maintenance of the military force. The other part belongs purely to the
subsistence, and has only, in consequence of the reciprocal action, a limited
influence on the combats by its results. The subjects which in one respect
belong to the fighting itself are marches, camps, and cantonments, for they
suppose so many different situations of troops, and where troops are supposed
there the idea of the combat must always be present.
The other subjects, which only belong to the
maintenance, are subsistence, care of the sick, the supply and repair of arms
and equipment.
Marches are quite identical with the use of the
troops. The act of marching in the combat, generally called manoeuvring,
certainly does not necessarily include the use of weapons, but it is so
completely and necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral part of
that which we call a combat. But the march outside the combat is nothing but
the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when,
where, and with what forces a battle is to be delivered—and to carry that into
execution the march is the only means.
The march outside of the combat is therefore an
instrument of strategy, but not on that account exclusively a subject of strategy,
for as the armed force which executes it may be involved in a possible combat
at any moment, therefore its execution stands also under tactical as well as
strategic rules. If we prescribe to a column its route on a particular side of
a river or of a branch of a mountain, then that is a strategic measure, for it
contains the intention of fighting on that particular side of the hill or river
in preference to the other, in case a combat should be necessary during the
march.
But if a column, instead of following the road
through a valley, marches along the parallel ridge of heights, or for the
convenience of marching divides itself into several columns, then these are
tactical arrangements, for they relate to the manner in which we shall use the
troops in the anticipated combat.
The particular order of march is in constant
relation with readiness for combat, is therefore tactical in its nature, for it
is nothing more than the first or preliminary disposition for the battle which
may possibly take place.
As the march is the instrument by which strategy
apportions its active elements, the combats, but these last often only appear
by their results and not in the details of their real course, it could not fail
to happen that in theory the instrument has often been substituted for the
efficient principle. Thus we hear of a decisive skilful march, allusion being
thereby made to those combat-combinations to which these marches led. This
substitution of ideas is too natural and conciseness of expression too desirable
to call for alteration, but still it is only a condensed chain of ideas in
regard to which we must never omit to bear in mind the full meaning, if we
would avoid falling into error.
We fall into an error of this description if we
attribute to strategical combinations a power independent of tactical results.
We read of marches and manœuvres combined, the object attained, and at the same
time not a word about combat, from which the conclusion is drawn that there are
means in War of conquering an enemy without fighting. The prolific nature of
this error we cannot show until hereafter.
But although a march can be regarded absolutely as
an integral part of the combat, still there are in it certain relations which
do not belong to the combat, and therefore are neither tactical nor strategic.
To these belong all arrangements which concern only the accommodation of the
troops, the construction of bridges, roads, &c. These are only conditions;
under many circumstances they are in very close connection, and may almost
identify themselves with the troops, as in building a bridge in presence of the
enemy; but in themselves they are always activities, the theory of which does
not form part of the theory of the conduct of War.
Camps, by which we mean every disposition of
troops in concentrated, therefore in battle order, in contradistinction to
cantonments or quarters, are a state of rest, therefore of restoration; but
they are at the same time also the strategic appointment of a battle on the
spot, chosen; and by the manner in which they are taken up they contain the
fundamental lines of the battle, a condition from which every defensive battle
starts; they are therefore essential parts of both strategy and tactics.
Cantonments take the place of camps for the better
refreshment of the troops. They are therefore, like camps, strategic subjects
as regards position and extent; tactical subjects as regards internal
organisation, with a view to readiness to fight.
The occupation of camps and cantonments no doubt
usually combines with the recuperation of the troops another object also, for
example, the covering a district of country, the holding a position; but it can
very well be only the first. We remind our readers that strategy may follow a
great diversity of objects, for everything which appears an advantage may be
the object of a combat, and the preservation of the instrument with which War
is made must necessarily very often become the object of its partial
combinations.
If, therefore, in such a case strategy ministers
only to the maintenance of the troops, we are not on that account out of the
field of strategy, for we are still engaged with the use of the military force,
because every disposition of that force upon any point Whatever of the theatre
of War is such a use.
But if the maintenance of the troops in camp or
quarters calls forth activities which are no employment of the armed force,
such as the construction of huts, pitching of tents, subsistence and sanitary
services in camps or quarters, then such belong neither to strategy nor
tactics.
Even entrenchments, the site and preparation of
which are plainly part of the order of battle, therefore tactical subjects, do
not belong to the theory of the conduct of War so far as respects the execution
of their construction the knowledge and skill required for such work being, in
point of fact, qualities inherent in the nature of an organised Army; the
theory of the combat takes them for granted.
Amongst the subjects which belong to the mere
keeping up of an armed force, because none of the parts are identified with the
combat, the victualling of the troops themselves comes first, as it must be
done almost daily and for each individual. Thus it is that it completely
permeates military action in the parts constituting strategy—we say parts
constituting strategy, because during a battle the subsistence of troops will
rarely have any influence in modifying the plan, although the thing is
conceivable enough. The care for the subsistence of the troops comes therefore
into reciprocal action chiefly with strategy, and there is nothing more common
than for the leading strategic features of a campaign and War to be traced out
in connection with a view to this supply. But however frequent and however
important these views of supply may be, the subsistence of the troops always
remains a completely different activity from the use of the troops, and the
former has only an influence on the latter by its results.
The other branches of administrative activity
which we have mentioned stand much farther apart from the use of the troops.
The care of sick and wounded, highly important as it is for the good of an
Army, directly affects it only in a small portion of the individuals composing
it, and therefore has only a weak and indirect influence upon the use of the
rest. The completing and replacing articles of arms and equipment, except so
far as by the organism of the forces it constitutes a continuous activity
inherent in them—takes place only periodically, and therefore seldom affects strategic
plans.
We must, however, here guard ourselves against a
mistake. In certain cases these subjects may be really of decisive importance.
The distance of hospitals and depôts of munitions may very easily be imagined
as the sole cause of very important strategic decisions. We do not wish either
to contest that point or to throw it into the shade. But we are at present
occupied not with the particular facts of a concrete case, but with abstract
theory; and our assertion therefore is that such an influence is too rare to
give the theory of sanitary measures and the supply of munitions and arms an
importance in theory of the conduct of War such as to make it worth while to
include in the theory of the conduct of War the consideration of the different
ways and systems which the above theories may furnish, in the same way as is
certainly necessary in regard to victualling troops.
If we have clearly understood the results of our
reflections, then the activities belonging to War divide themselves into two
principal classes, into such as are only “preparations for War” and into the
“War itself.” This division must therefore also be made in theory.
The knowledge and applications of skill in the
preparations for War are engaged in the creation, discipline, and maintenance
of all the military forces; what general names should be given to them we do
not enter into, but we see that artillery, fortification, elementary tactics,
as they are called, the whole organisation and administration of the various
armed forces, and all such things are included. But the theory of War itself
occupies itself with the use of these prepared means for the object of the war.
It needs of the first only the results, that is, the knowledge of the principal
properties of the means taken in hand for use. This we call “The Art of War” in
a limited sense, or “Theory of the Conduct of War,” or “Theory of the
Employment of Armed Forces,” all of them denoting for us the same thing.
The present theory will therefore treat the combat
as the real contest, marches, camps, and cantonments as circumstances which are
more or less identical with it. The subsistence of the troops will only come
into consideration like other given circumstances in respect of its results,
not as an activity belonging to the combat.
The Art of War thus viewed in its limited sense
divides itself again into tactics and strategy. The former occupies itself with
the form of the separate combat, the latter with its use. Both connect
themselves with the circumstances of marches, camps, cantonments only through
the combat, and these circumstances are tactical or strategic according as they
relate to the form or to the signification of the battle.
No doubt there will be many readers who will
consider superfluous this careful separation of two things lying so close
together as tactics and strategy, because it has no direct effect on the
conduct itself of War. We admit, certainly that it would be pedantry to look
for direct effects on the field of battle from a theoretical distinction.
But the first business of every theory is to clear
up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together, and, we may say,
entangled and confused; and only when a right understanding is established, as
to names and conceptions, can we hope to progress with clearness and facility,
and be certain that author and reader will always see things from the same
point of view. Tactics and strategy are two activities mutually permeating each
other in time and space, at the same time essentially different activities, the
inner laws and mutual relations of which cannot be intelligible at all to the
mind until a clear conception of the nature of each activity is established.
He to whom all this is nothing, must either
repudiate all theoretical consideration, or his understanding has not as yet
been pained by the confused and perplexing ideas resting on no fixed point of
view, leading to no satisfactory result, sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic,
sometimes floating in vague generalities, which we are often obliged to hear
and read on the conduct of War, owing to the spirit of scientific investigation
having hitherto been little directed to these subjects.