BOOK
V
MILITARY
FORCES
CHAPTER I - General Scheme
We shall consider military forces:
1. As regards their numerical strength and
organisation.
2. In their state independent of fighting.
3. In respect of their maintenance; and, lastly,
4. In their general relations to country and
ground.
Thus we shall devote this book to the
consideration of things appertaining to an army, which only come under the head
of necessary conditions of fighting, but do not constitute the fight itself.
They stand in more or less close connection with and react upon the fighting,
and therefore, in considering the application of the combat they must often
appear; but we must first consider each by itself, as a whole, in its essence
and peculiarities.
CHAPTER II - Theatre of War,
Army, Campaign
The nature of the things does not allow of a
completely satisfactory definition of these three factors, denoting
respectively, space, mass, and time in war; but that we may not sometimes be
quite misunderstood, we must try to make somewhat plainer the usual meaning of
these terms, to which we shall in most cases adhere.
1.—Theatre of War.
This term denotes properly such a portion of the
space over which war prevails as has its boundaries protected, and thus
possesses a kind of independence. This protection may consist in fortresses, or
important natural obstacles presented by the country, or even in its being
separated by a considerable distance from the rest of the space embraced in the
war.—Such a portion is not a mere piece of the whole, but a small whole
complete in itself; and consequently it is more or less in such a condition
that changes which take place at other points in the seat of war have only an
indirect and no direct influence upon it. To give an adequate idea of this, we
may suppose that on this portion an advance is made, whilst in another quarter
a retreat is taking place, or that upon the one an army is acting defensively,
whilst an offensive is being carried on upon the other. Such a clearly defined
idea as this is not capable of universal application; it is here used merely to
indicate the line of distinction.
2.—Army.
With the assistance of the conception of a Theatre
of War, it is very easy to say what an Army is: it is, in point of fact, the
mass of troops in the same Theatre of War. But this plainly does not include
all that is meant by the term in its common usage. Blücher and Wellington
commanded each a separate army in 1815, although the two were in the same
Theatre of War. The chief command is, therefore, another distinguishing sign
for the conception of an Army. At the same time this sign is very nearly allied
to the preceding, for where things are well organised, there should only exist
one supreme command in a Theatre of War, and the commander-in-chief in a
particular Theatre of War should always have a proportionate degree of
independence.
The mere absolute numerical strength of a body of
troops is less decisive on the subject than might at first appear. For where
several Armies are acting under one command, and upon one and the same Theatre
of War, they are called Armies, not by reason of their strength, but from the
relations antecedent to the war (1813, the Silesian Army, the Army of the
North, etc), and although we should divide a great mass of troops intended to
remain in the same Theatre into corps, we should never divide them into Armies,
at least, such a division would be contrary to what seems to be the meaning
which is universally attached to the term. On the other hand, it would
certainly be pedantry to apply the term Army to each band of irregular troops
acting independently in a remote province: still we must not leave unnoticed
that it surprises no one when the Army of the Vendeans in the Revolutionary War
is spoken of, and yet it was not much stronger.
The conceptions of Army and Theatre of War
therefore, as a rule, go together, and mutually include each other.
3.—Campaign.
Although the sum of all military events which
happen in all the Theatres of War in one year is often called a Campaign,
still, however, it is more usual and more exact to understand by the term the
events in one single Theatre of War. But it is worse still to connect the
notion of a Campaign with the period of one year, for wars no longer divide
themselves naturally into Campaigns of a year’s duration by fixed and long
periods in winter quarters. As, however, the events in a Theatre of War of
themselves form certain great chapters—if, for instance, the direct effects of
some more or less great catastrophe cease, and new combinations begin to
develop themselves—therefore these natural subdivisions must be taken into consideration
in order to allot to each year (Campaign) its complete share of events. No one
would make the Campaign of 1812 terminate at Memel, where the armies were on
the 1st January, and transfer the further retreat of the French until they
recrossed the Elbe to the campaign of 1813, as that further retreat was plainly
only a part of the whole retreat from Moscow.
That we cannot give these conceptions any greater
degree of distinctness is of no consequence, because they cannot be used as
philosophical definitions for the basis of any kind of propositions. They only
serve to give a little more clearness and precision to the language we use.
CHAPTER III - Relation of Power
In the eighth chapter of the third book we have
spoken of the value of superior numbers in battles, from which follows as a
consequence the superiority of numbers in general in strategy. So far the
importance of the relations of power is established: we shall now add a few
more detailed considerations on the subject.
An unbiassed examination of modern military
history leads to the conviction that the superiority in numbers becomes every
day more decisive; the principle of assembling the greatest possible numbers
for a decisive battle may therefore be regarded as more important than ever.
Courage and the spirit of an army have, in all
ages, multiplied its physical powers, and will continue to do so equally in
future; but we find also that at certain periods in history a superiority in
the organisation and equipment of an army has given a great moral
preponderance; we find that at other periods a great superiority in mobility
had a like effect; at one time we see a new system of tactics brought to light;
at another we see the art of war developing itself in an effort to make a
skilful use of ground on great general principles, and by such means here and
there we find one general gaining great advantages over another; but even this
tendency has disappeared, and wars now go on in a simpler and more natural
manner.—If, divesting ourselves of any preconceived notions, we look at the
experiences of recent wars, we must admit that there are but little traces of
any of the above influences, either throughout any whole campaign, or in
engagements of a decisive character—that is, the great battle, respecting which
term we refer to the second chapter of the preceding book.
Armies are in our days so much on a par in regard
to arms, equipment, and drill, that there is no very notable difference between
the best and the worst in these things. A difference may still be observed,
resulting from the superior instruction of the scientific corps, but in general
it only amounts to this, that one is the inventor and introducer of improved
appliances, which the other immediately imitates. Even the subordinate generals,
leaders of corps and divisions, in all that comes within the scope of their
sphere, have in general everywhere the same ideas and methods, so that, except
the talent of the commander-in-chief—a thing entirely dependent on chance, and
not bearing a constant relation to the standard of education amongst the people
and the army—there is nothing now but habituation to war which can give one
army a decided superiority over another. The nearer we approach to a state of
equality in all these things, the more decisive becomes the relation in point
of numbers.
The character of modern battles is the result of
this state of equality. Take for instance the battle of Borodino, where the
first army in the world, the French, measured its strength with the Russian, which,
in many parts of its organisation, and in the education of its special
branches, might be considered the furthest behindhand. In the whole battle
there is not one single trace of superior art or intelligence, it is a mere
trial of strength between the respective armies throughout; and as they were
nearly equal in that respect, the result could not be otherwise than a gradual
turn of the scale in favour of that side where there was the greatest energy on
the part of the commander, and the most experience in war on the part of the
troops. We have taken this battle as an illustration, because in it there was
an equality in the numbers on each side such as is rarely to be found.
We do not maintain that all battles exactly
resemble this, but it shows the dominant tone of most of them.
In a battle in which the forces try their strength
on each other so leisurely and methodically, an excess of force on one side
must make the result in its favour much more certain. And it is a fact that we
may search modern military history in vain for a battle in which an army has
beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in
former times. Buonaparte, the greatest general of modern times, in all his
great victorious battles—with one exception, that of Dresden, 1813—had managed
to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to
that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at
Leipsic, Brienne, Laon, and Belle-Alliance, he was beaten.
The absolute strength is in strategy generally a
given quantity, which the commander cannot alter. But from this it by no means
follows that it is impossible to carry on a war with a decidedly inferior
force. War is not always a voluntary act of state policy, and least of all is
it so when the forces are very unequal: consequently, any relation of forces is
imaginable in war, and it would be a strange theory of war which would wish to
give up its office just where it is most wanted.
However desirable theory may consider a
proportionate force, still it cannot say that no use can be made of the most
disproportionate. No limits can be prescribed in this respect.
The weaker the force the more moderate must be the
object it proposes to itself, and the weaker the force the shorter time it will
last. In these two directions there is a field for weakness to give way, if we
may use this expression. Of the changes which the measure of the force produces
in the conduct of war, we can only speak by degrees, as these things present
themselves; at present it is sufficient to have indicated the general point of
view, but to complete that we shall add one more observation.
The more that an army involved in an unequal
combat falls short of the number of its opponents, the greater must be the
tension of its powers, the greater its energy when danger presses. If the
reverse takes place, and instead of heroic desperation a spirit of despondency
ensues, then certainly there is an end to every art of war.
If with this energy of powers is combined a wise
moderation in the object proposed, then there is that play of brilliant actions
and prudent forbearance which we admire in the wars of Frederick the Great.
But the less that this moderation and caution can
effect, the more must the tension and energy of the forces become predominant.
When the disproportion of forces is so great that no modification of our own
object can ensure us safety from a catastrophe, or where the probable
continuance of the danger is so great that the greatest economy of our powers
can no longer suffice to bring us to our object, then the tension of our powers
should be concentrated for one desperate blow; he who is pressed on all sides
expecting little help from things which promise none, will place his last and
only reliance in the moral ascendancy which despair gives to courage, and look
upon the greatest daring as the greatest wisdom,—at the same time employ the
assistance of subtle stratagem, and if he does not succeed, will find in an
honourable downfall the right to rise hereafter.
CHAPTER IV - Relation of the
Three Arms
We shall only speak of the three principal arms:
Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery.
We must be excused for making the following
analysis which belongs more to tactics, but is necessary to give distinctness
to our ideas.
The combat is of two kinds, which are essentially
different: the destructive principle of fire, and the hand to hand or personal
combat. This latter, again, is either attack or defence. (As we here speak of
elements, attack and defence are to be understood in a perfectly absolute
sense.) Artillery, obviously, acts only with the destructive principle of fire.
Cavalry only with personal combat. Infantry with both.
In close combat the essence of defence consists in
standing firm, as if rooted to the ground; the essence of the attack is
movement. Cavalry is entirely deficient in the first quality; on the other
hand, it possesses the latter in an especial manner. It is therefore only
suited for attack. Infantry has especially the property of standing firm, but
is not altogether without mobility.
From this division of the elementary forces of war
into different arms, we have as a result, the superiority and general utility
of Infantry as compared with the other two arms, from its being the only arm
which unites in itself all the three elementary forces. A further deduction to
be drawn is, that the combination of the three arms leads to a more perfect use
of the forces, by affording the means of strengthening at pleasure either the
one or the other of the principles which are united in an unalterable manner in
Infantry.
The destructive principle of fire is in the wars
of the present time plainly beyond measure the most effective; nevertheless,
the close combat, man to man, is just as plainly to be regarded as the real
basis of combat. For that reason, therefore, an army of artillery only would be
an absurdity in war, but an army of cavalry is conceivable, only it would
possess very little intensity of force An army of infantry alone is not only
conceivable but also much the strongest of the three. The three arms,
therefore, stand in this order in reference to independent value—Infantry,
Cavalry, Artillery.
But this order does not hold good if applied to
the relative importance of each arm when they are all three acting in
conjunction. As the destructive principle is much more effective than the
principle of motion, therefore the complete want of cavalry would weaken an
army less than the total want of artillery.
An army consisting of infantry and artillery
alone, would certainly find itself in a disagreeable position if opposed to an
army composed of all three arms; but if what it lacked in cavalry was
compensated for by a proportionate increase of infantry, it would still, by a
somewhat different mode of acting, be able to do very well with its tactical
economy. Its outpost service would cause some embarrassment; it would never be
able to pursue a beaten enemy with great vivacity, and it must make a retreat
with greater hardships and efforts; but these inconveniences would still never
be sufficient in themselves to drive it completely out of the field.—On the
other hand, such an army opposed to one composed of infantry and cavalry only
would be able to play a very good part, while it is hardly conceivable that the
latter could keep the field at all against an army made up of all three arms.
Of course these reflections on the relative
importance of each single arm result only from a consideration of the
generality of events in war, where one case compensates another; and therefore
it is not our intention to apply the truth thus ascertained to each individual
case of a particular combat. A battalion on outpost service or on a retreat
may, perhaps, choose to have with it a squadron in preference to a couple of
guns. A body of cavalry with horse artillery, sent in rapid pursuit of, or to
cut off, a flying enemy wants no infantry, etc., etc.
If we summarise the results of these
considerations they amount to this.
1. That infantry is the most independent of the
three arms.
2. Artillery is quite wanting in independence.
3. Infantry is the most important in the
combination of the three arms.
4. Cavalry can the most easily be dispensed with.
5. A combination of the three arms gives the
greatest strength.
Now, if the combination of the three gives the
greatest strength, it is natural to inquire what is the best absolute
proportion of each, but that is a question which it is almost impossible to
answer.
If we could form a comparative estimate of the
cost of organising in the first instance, and then provisioning and maintaining
each of the three arms, and then again of the relative amount of service
rendered by each in war, we should obtain a definite result which would give
the best proportion in the abstract. But this is little more than a play of the
imagination. The very first term in the comparison is difficult to determine,
that is to say, one of the factors, the cost in money, is not difficult to
find; but another, the value of men’s lives, is a computation which no one
would readily try to solve by figures.
Also the circumstance that each of the three arms
chiefly depends on a different element of strength in the state—Infantry on the
number of the male population, cavalry on the number of horses, artillery on
available financial means—introduces into the calculation some heterogeneous
conditions, the overruling influence of which may be plainly observed in the
great outlines of the history of different people at various periods.
As, however, for other reasons we cannot
altogether dispense with some standard of comparison, therefore, in place of
the whole of the first term of the comparison we must take only that one of its
factors which can be ascertained, namely, the cost in money. Now on this point
it is sufficient for our purpose to assume that, in general, a squadron of 150
horsemen, a battalion of infantry 800 strong, a battery of artillery consisting
of 8 six-pounders, cost nearly the same, both as respects the expense of
formation and of maintenance.
With regard to the other member of the comparison,
that is, how much service the one arm is capable of rendering as compared with
the others, it is much less easy to find any distinct quantity. The thing might
perhaps be possible if it depended merely on the destroying principle; but each
arm is destined to its own particular use, therefore has its own particular
sphere of action, which, again, is not so distinctly defined that it might not
be greater or less through modifications only in the mode of conducting the
war, without causing any decided disadvantage.
We are often told of what experience teaches on
this subject, and it is supposed that military history affords the information
necessary for a settlement of the question, but every one must look upon all
that as nothing more than a way of talking, which, as it is not derived from
anything of a primary and necessary nature, does not deserve attention in an
analytical examination.
Now although a fixed ratio as representing the
best proportion between the three arms is conceivable, but is an x which it is
impossible to find, a mere imaginary quantity, still it is possible to
appreciate the effects of having a great superiority or a great inferiority in
one particular arm as compared with the same arm in the enemy’s army.
Artillery increases the destructive principle of
fire; it is the most redoubtable of arms, and its want, therefore, diminishes
very considerably the intensive force of an army. On the other hand, it is the
least moveable, consequently, makes an army more unwieldy; further, it always
requires a force for its support, because it is incapable of close combat; if
it is too numerous, so that the troops appointed for its protection are not
able to resist the attacks of the enemy at every point, it is often lost, and
from that follows a fresh disadvantage, because of the three arms it is the
only one which in its principal parts, that is guns and carriages, the enemy
can soon use against us.
Cavalry increases the principle of mobility in an
army. If too few in number the brisk flame of the elements of war is thereby
weakened, because everything must be done slower (on foot), everything must be
organised with more care; the rich harvest of victory, instead of being cut
with a scythe, can only be reaped with a sickle.
An excess of cavalry can certainly never be looked
upon as a direct diminution of the combatant force, as an organic
disproportion, but it may certainly be so indirectly, on account of the
difficulty of feeding that arm, and also if we reflect that instead of a
surplus of 10,000 horsemen not required we might have 50,000 infantry.
These peculiarities arising from the preponderance
of one arm are the more important to the art of war in its limited sense, as
that art teaches the use of whatever forces are forthcoming; and when forces
are placed under the command of a general, the proportion of the three arms is
also commonly already settled without his having had much voice in the matter.
If we would form an idea of the character of
warfare modified by the preponderance of one or other of the three arms it is
to be done in the following manner:—
An excess of artillery leads to a more defensive
and passive character in our measures; our interest will be to seek security in
strong positions, great natural obstacles of ground, even in mountain
positions, in order that the natural impediments we find in the ground may
undertake the defence and protection of our numerous artillery, and that the
enemy’s forces may come themselves and seek their own destruction. The whole
war will be carried on in a serious formal minuet step.
On the other hand, a want of artillery will make
us prefer the offensive, the active, the mobile principle; marching, fatigue,
exertion, become our special weapons, thus the war will become more
diversified, more lively, rougher; small change is substituted for great
events.
With a very numerous cavalry we seek wide plains,
and take to great movements. At a greater distance from the enemy we enjoy more
rest and greater conveniences without conferring the same advantages on our
adversary. We may venture on bolder measures to outflank him, and on more
daring movements generally, as we have command over space. In as far as
diversions and invasions are true auxiliary means of war we shall be able to
make use of them with greater facility.
A decided want of cavalry diminishes the force of
mobility in an army without increasing its destructive power as an excess of
artillery does. Prudence and method become then the leading characteristics of
the war. Always to remain near the enemy in order to keep him constantly in
view—no rapid, still less hurried movements, everywhere a slow pushing on of
well concentrated masses—a preference for the defensive and for broken country,
and, when the offensive must be resorted to, the shortest road direct to the
centre of force in the enemy’s army—these are the natural tendencies or
principles in such cases.
These different forms which warfare takes
according as one or other of the three arms preponderates, seldom have an
influence so complete and decided as alone, or chiefly to determine the
direction of a whole undertaking. Whether we shall act strategically on the
offensive or defensive, the choice of a theatre of war, the determination to
fight a great battle, or adopt some other means of destruction, are points
which must be determined by other and more essential considerations, at least,
if this is not the case, it is much to be feared that we have mistaken minor
details for the chief consideration. But although this is so, although the
great questions must be decided before on other grounds, there still always
remains a certain margin for the influence of the preponderating arm, for in
the offensive we can always be prudent and methodical, in the defensive bold
and enterprising, etc., etc., through all the different stages and gradations
of the military life.
On the other hand, the nature of a war may have a
notable influence on the proportions of the three arms.
First, a national war, kept up by militia and a
general levy (Landsturm), must naturally bring into the field a very numerous
infantry; for in such wars there is a greater want of the means of equipment
than of men, and as the equipment consequently is confined to what is
indisputably necessary, we may easily imagine, that for every battery of eight
pieces, not only one, but two or three battalions might be raised.
Second, if a weak state opposed to a powerful one
cannot take refuge in a general call of the male population to regular military
service, or in a militia system resembling it, then the increase of its
artillery is certainly the shortest way of bringing up its weak army nearer to
an equality with that of the enemy, for it saves men, and intensifies the
essential principle of military force, that is, the destructive principle. Any
way, such a state will mostly be confined to a limited theatre, and therefore
this arm will be better suited to it. Frederick the Great adopted this means in
the later period of the Seven Years’ War.
Third, cavalry is the arm for movement and great
decisions; its increase beyond the ordinary proportions is therefore important
if the war extends over a great space, if expeditions are to be made in various
directions, and great and decisive blows are intended. Buonaparte is an example
of this.
That the offensive and defensive do not properly
in themselves exercise an influence on the proportion of cavalry will only
appear plainly when we come to speak of these two methods of acting in war; in
the meantime, we shall only remark that both assailant and defender as a rule
traverse the same spaces in war, and may have also, at least in many cases, the
same decisive intentions. We remind our readers of the campaign of 1812.
It is commonly believed that, in the middle ages,
cavalry was much more numerous in proportion to infantry, and that the
difference has been gradually on the decrease ever since. Yet this is a
mistake, at least partly. The proportion of cavalry was, according to numbers,
on the average perhaps, not much greater; of this we may convince ourselves by
tracing, through the history of the middle ages, the detailed statements of the
armed forces then employed. Let us only think of the masses of men on foot who
composed the armies of the Crusaders, or the masses who followed the Emperors
of Germany on their Roman expeditions. It was in reality the importance of the
cavalry which was so much greater in those days; it was the stronger arm,
composed of the flower of the people, so much so that, although always very
much weaker actually in numbers, it was still always looked upon as the chief
thing, infantry was little valued, hardly spoken of; hence has arisen the
belief that its numbers were few. No doubt it happened oftener than it does
now, that in incursions of small importance in France, Germany, and Italy, a
small army was composed entirely of cavalry; as it was the chief arm, there is
nothing inconsistent in that; but these cases decide nothing if we take a
general view, as they are greatly outnumbered by cases of greater armies of the
period constituted differently. It was only when the obligations to military
service imposed by the feudal laws had ceased, and wars were carried on by
soldiers enlisted, hired, and paid—when, therefore, wars depended on money and
enlistment, that is, at the time of the Thirty Years’ War, and the wars of
Louis XIV.—that this employment of great masses of almost useless infantry was
checked, and perhaps in those days they might have fallen into the exclusive
use of cavalry, if infantry had not just then risen in importance through the
improvements in fire-arms, by which means it maintained its numerical
superiority in proportion to cavalry; at this period, if infantry was weak, the
proportion was as one to one, if numerous as three to one.
Since then cavalry has always decreased in
importance according as improvements in the use of fire-arms have advanced.
This is intelligible enough in itself, but the improvement we speak of does not
relate solely to the weapon itself and the skill in handling it; we advert also
to greater ability in using troops armed with this weapon. At the battle of
Mollwitz the Prussian army had brought the fire of their infantry to such a
state of perfection, that there has been no improvement since then in that
sense. On the other hand, the use of infantry in broken ground and as
skirmishers has been introduced more recently, and is to be looked upon as a
very great advance in the art of destruction.
Our opinion is, therefore, that the relation of
cavalry has not much changed as far as regards numbers, but as regards its
importance, there has been a great alteration. This seems to be a
contradiction, but is not so in reality. The infantry of the middle ages,
although forming the greater proportion of an army, did not attain to that
proportion by its value as compared to cavalry, but because all that could not
be appointed to the very costly cavalry were handed over to the infantry; this
infantry was, therefore, merely a last resource; and if the number of cavalry
had depended merely on the value set on that arm, it could never have been too
great. Thus we can understand how cavalry, in spite of its constantly
decreasing importance, may still, perhaps, have importance enough to keep its
numerical relation at that point which it has hitherto so constantly
maintained.
It is a remarkable fact that, at least since the
wars of the Austrian succession, the proportion of cavalry to infantry has
changed very little, the variation being constantly between a fourth, a fifth
or a sixth; this seems to indicate that those proportions meet the natural
requirements of an army, and that these numbers give the solution which it is
impossible to find in a direct manner. We doubt, however, if this is the case,
and we find the principal instances of the employment of a numerous cavalry
sufficiently accounted for by other causes.
Austria and Russia are states which have kept up a
numerous cavalry, because they retain in their political condition the
fragments of a Tartar organisation. Buonaparte for his purposes could never be
strong enough in cavalry; when he had made use of the conscription as far as
possible, he had no ways of strengthening his armies, but by increasing the
auxiliary arms, as they cost him more in money than in men. Besides this, it
stands to reason that in military enterprises of such enormous extent as his,
cavalry must have a greater value than in ordinary cases.
Frederick the Great it is well known reckoned
carefully every recruit that could be saved to his country; it was his great
business to keep up the strength of his army, as far as possible at the expense
of other countries. His reasons for this are easy to conceive, if we remember
that his small dominions did not then include Prussia and the Westphalian
provinces. Cavalry was kept complete by recruitment more easily than infantry,
irrespective of fewer men being required; in addition to which, his system of
war was completely founded on the mobility of his army, and thus it was, that
while his infantry diminished in number, his cavalry was always increasing
itself till the end of the Seven Years’ War. Still at the end of that war it
was hardly more than a fourth of the number of infantry that he had in the
field.
At the period referred to there is no want of
instances, also of armies entering the field unusually weak in cavalry, and yet
carrying off the victory. The most remarkable is the battle of Gross-gorschen.
If we only count the French divisions which took part in the battle, Buonaparte
was 100,000 strong, of which 5,000 were cavalry, 90,000 infantry; the Allies
had 70,000, of which 25,000 were cavalry and 40,000 infantry. Thus, in place of
the 20,000 cavalry on the side of the Allies in excess of the total of the
French cavalry, Buonaparte had only 50,000 additional infantry when he ought to
have had 100,000. As he gained the battle with that superiority in infantry, we
may ask whether it was at all likely that he would have lost it if the
proportions had been 140,000 to 40,000.
Certainly the great advantage of our superiority
in cavalry was shown immediately after the battle, for Buonaparte gained hardly
any trophies by his victory. The gain of a battle is therefore not
everything,—but is it not always the chief thing?
If we put together these considerations, we can hardly
believe that the numerical proportion between cavalry and infantry which has
existed for the last eighty years is the natural one, founded solely on their
absolute value; we are much rather inclined to think, that after many
fluctuations, the relative proportions of these arms will change further in the
same direction as hitherto, and that the fixed number of cavalry at last will
be considerably less.
With respect to artillery, the number of guns has
naturally increased since its first invention, and according as it has been
made lighter and otherwise improved; still since the time of Frederick the
Great, it has also kept very much to the same proportion of two or three guns
per 1,000 men, we mean at the commencement of a campaign; for during its course
artillery does not melt away as fast as infantry, therefore at the end of a
campaign the proportion is generally notably greater, perhaps three, four, or
five guns per 1,000 men. Whether this is the natural proportion, or that the
increase of artillery may be carried still further, without prejudice to the
whole conduct of war, must be left for experience to decide.
The principal results we obtain from the whole of
these considerations, are—
1. That infantry is the chief arm, to which the
other two are subordinate.
2. That by the exercise of great skill and energy
in command, the want of the two subordinate arms may in some measure be
compensated for, provided that we are much stronger in infantry; and the better
the infantry the easier this may be done.
3. That it is more difficult to dispense with
artillery than with cavalry, because it is the chief principle of destruction,
and its mode of fighting is more amalgamated with that of infantry.
4. That artillery being the strongest arm, as
regards destructive action, and cavalry the weakest in that respect, the
question must in general arise, how much artillery can we have without
inconvenience, and what is the least proportion of cavalry we require?
