Thursday, 4 February 2021

Thursday's Serial: "O Guarani" by José de Alencar (in Portuguese) - IV

Capítulo X - Ao Alvorecer

No dia seguinte, ao raiar da manhã, Cecília abriu a portinha do jardim e aproximou-se da cerca.

—Peri! disse ela.

O índio apareceu à entrada da cabana; correu alegre, mas tímido e submisso.

Cecília sentou-se num banco de relva; e a muito custo conseguiu tomar um arzinho de severidade, que de vez em quando quase traia-se por um sorriso teimoso que lhe queria fugir dos lábios.

Fitou um momento no índio os seus grandes olhos azuis com uma expressão de doce repreensão; depois disse-lhe em um tom mais de queixa do que de rigor:

—Estou muito zangada com Peri!

O semblante do selvagem anuviou-se.

—Tu, senhora, zangada com Peri! Por quê?

—Porque Peri é mau e ingrato; em vez de ficar perto de sua senhora, vai caçar em risco de morrer! disse a moça ressentida.

—Ceci desejou ver uma onça viva!

—Então não posso gracejar? Basta que eu deseje uma coisa para que tu corras atrás dela como um louco?

—Quando Ceci acha bonita uma flor, Peri não vai buscar? perguntou o índio.

—Vai, sim.

—Quando Ceci ouve cantar o sofrer, Peri não o vai procurar?

—Que tem isso?

—Pois Ceci desejou ver uma onça, Peri a foi buscar.

Cecília não pôde reprimir um sorriso ouvindo esse silogismo rude, a que a linguagem singela e concisa do índio dava uma certa poesia e originalidade.

Mas estava resolvida a conservar a sua severidade, e ralhar com Peri por causa do susto que lhe havia feito na véspera.

—Isto não é razão, continuou ela; porventura um animal feroz é a mesma coisa que um pássaro, e apanha-se como uma flor?

—Tudo é o mesmo, desde que te causa prazer, senhora.

—Mas então, exclamou a menina com um assomo de impaciência, se eu te pedisse aquela nuvem?...

E apontou para os brancos vapores que passavam ainda envolvidos nas sombras pálidas da noite.

—Peri ia buscar.

—A nuvem? perguntou a moça admirada.

—Sim, a nuvem.

Cecília pensou que o índio tinha perdido a cabeça; ele continuou:

—Somente como a nuvem não é da terra e o homem não pode tocá-la, Peri morria e ia pedir ao Senhor do céu a nuvem para dar a Ceci.

Estas palavras foram ditas com a simplicidade com que fala o coração.

A menina que um momento duvidara da razão de Peri, compreendeu toda a sublime abnegação, toda a delicadeza de sentimento dessa alma inculta.

A sua fingida severidade não pôde mais resistir; deixou pairar nos seus lábios um sorriso divino.

—Obrigada, meu bom Peri! Tu és um amigo dedicado; mas não quero que arrisques tua vida para satisfazer um capricho meu; e sim que a conserves para me defenderes como já fizeste uma vez.

—Senhora, não está mais zangada com Peri?

—Não; apesar de que devia estar; porque Peri ontem fez sua senhora afligir-se cuidando que ele ia morrer.

—E Ceci ficou triste? exclamou o índio.

—Ceci chorou! respondeu a menina com uma graciosa ingenuidade.

—Perdoa, senhora!

—Não só te perdôo, mas quero também fazer-te o meu presente.

Cecília correu ao seu quarto e trouxe o rico par de pistolas que havia encomendado a Álvaro.

—Olha! Peri não desejava ter umas?

—Muito!

—Pois aqui tens! Tu não as deixarás nunca porque são uma lembrança de Cecília, não é verdade?

—Oh! o sol deixará primeiro a Peri, do que Peri a elas.

—Quando correres algum perigo, lembra-te que Cecília as deu para defenderem e salvarem a tua vida.

—Por que é tua, não é, senhora?

—Sim, porque é minha, e quero que a conserves para mim.

O rosto de Peri irradiava com o sentimento de um gozo imenso, de uma felicidade infinita; meteu as pistolas na cinta de penas e ergueu a cabeça orgulhoso, como um rei que acabasse de receber a unção de Deus.

Para ele essa menina, esse anjo louro, de olhos azuis, representava a divindade na terra; admirá-la, fazê-la sorrir, vê-la feliz, era o seu culto; culto santo e respeitoso em que o seu coração vertia os tesouros de sentimentos e poesia que transbordavam dessa natureza virgem.

Isabel entrou no jardim; a pobre menina tinha velado toda a noite, e o seu rosto parecia conservar ainda os traços de algumas dessas lágrimas ardentes que escaldam o seio e requeimam as faces.

A moça e o índio nem se olharam; odiavam-se mutuamente; era uma antipatia que começara desde o momento em que se viram, e que cada dia aumentava.

—Agora, Peri, Isabel e eu vamos ao banho.

—Peri te acompanha, senhora?

—Sim, mas com a condição de que Peri há de estar muito quieto e sossegado.

A razão por que Cecília impunha esta condição, só podia bem compreender quem tivesse assistido a uma das cenas que se passavam quando as duas moças iam banhar-se, o que sucedia quase sempre ao domingo.

Peri, com o seu arco, companheiro inseparável e arma terrível na sua mão destra, sentava-se longe, à beira do rio, numa das pontas mais altas do rochedo ou no galho de alguma árvore, e não deixava ninguém aproximar-se num raio de vinte passos do lagar onde as moças se banhavam.

Quando algum aventureiro por acaso transpunha esse círculo que o índio traçava com o olhar em redor de si, Peri na posição sobranceira em que se colocara o percebia imediatamente.

Então se o descuidado caçador sentia o seu chapéu ornar-se de repente com uma pena vermelha que voava pelos ares sibilando; se via uma seta arrebatar-lhe o fruto que ele estendia a mão para colher; se parava assustado diante de uma longa flecha emplumada que despedida por elevação vinha cair-lhe a dois passos da frente como para embargar-lhe o caminho e servir de baliza: não se admirava.

Compreendia imediatamente o que isto queria dizer; e pelo respeito que todos votavam a D. Antônio de Mariz e à sua família, arrepiava caminho; e voltava lançando uma jura contra Peri que lhe crivara o chapéu e o obrigara a encolher a mão de susto.

E fazia bem em voltar, porque o índio com o seu zelo ardente não duvidaria vazar-lhe os olhos para evitar que chegando-se à beira do rio, visse a moça a banhar-se nas águas.

Entretanto Cecília e sua prima tinham o costume de banhar-se vestidas com um trajo feito de ligeira estamenha que ocultava inteiramente sob a cor escura as formas do corpo, deixando-lhes os movimentos livres para nadarem.

Mas Peri entendia que apesar disto seria uma profanação consentir que um olhar de quem quer que fosse visse a senhora no seu trajo de banho; nem mesmo o dele que era seu escravo, e por conseguinte não podia ofendê-la, a ela que era o seu único deus.

Enquanto porém o índio mantinha assim pela certeza de sua vista rápida, e pela projeção das suas flechas esse círculo impenetrável para quem quer que fosse, não deixava de olhar com uma atenção escrupulosa a corrente e as margens do rio.

O peixe que beijava a flor da água, e que podia ir ofender a moca; uma cobra verde inocente que se enroscava pelas folhas dos aguapés; um camaleão que se aquecia ao sol fazendo cintilar o seu prisma de cores brilhantes; um sagüi branco e felpudo que se divertia a fazer caretas maliciosas suspendendo-se pela cauda ao galho de uma árvore; tudo quanto podia ir causar um susto à moça, o índio fazia fugir, se estava longe, e se estava perto, pregava o animal imóvel sobre o tronco ou sobre o chão.

Se um ramo arrastado pela corrente passava, se um pouco do limo das águas despegava-se da margem pedregosa do rio, se o fruto de uma sapucaia pendida sobre o Paquequer estalava prestes a cair, o índio, veloz como o tiro do seu arco, lançava-se e retinha o coco no meio da sua queda, ou precipitava-se na água e apanhava os objetos que boiavam.

Cecília podia ser ofendida pelo tronco que a correnteza carregava, pela fruta que caía; podia assustar-se com o contato do limo julgando ser uma cobra; e Peri não perdoaria a si mesmo a mais leve mágoa que a moça sofresse por falta de cuidado seu.

Enfim ele estendia ao redor dela uma vigilância tão constante e infatigável, uma proteção tão inteligente e delicada, que a moça podia descansar, certa de que, se sofresse alguma coisa, seria porque todo o poder do homem fora impotente para evitar.

Eis pois a razão por que Cecília recomendava a Peri que estivesse quieto e sossegado; é verdade que ela sabia que essa recomendação era sempre inútil, e que o índio faria tudo para que uma abelha sequer não viesse beijar os seus lábios vermelhos confundindo-os com uma flor de pequiá.

Quando as duas mocas atravessaram a esplanada, Álvaro passeava junto da escada.

Cecília saudou de passagem com um sorriso ao jovem cavalheiro; e desceu ligeiramente seguida por sua prima.

Álvaro que tinha procurado ler-lhe nos olhos e no rosto o perdão de sua loucura da véspera, e nada havia percebido que acabasse com o seu receio, quis seguir a moça, e falar-lhe.

Voltou-se para ver se alguém estava ali que reparasse no que ia fazer, e deu com o italiano que a dois passos dele o olhava com um dos seus sorrisos sarcásticos.

—Bom dia, sr. cavalheiro.

Os dois inimigos trocaram um olhar que se cruzara como laminas de aço que rogassem uma na outra.

Nesse momento Peri se aproximava lentamente deles, carregando uma das pistolas que Cecília lhe havia dado há alguns minutos.

O índio parou, e com um ligeiro sorriso de uma expressão indefinível tomou as pistolas pelo cano e apresentou-as uma a Álvaro e outra a Loredano.

Ambos compreenderam o gesto e o sorriso; ambos sentiram que tinham cometido uma imprudência, e que o espírito perspicaz do selvagem havia lido nos seus olhos um ódio profundo, e talvez a causa desse ódio.

Voltaram-se fingindo não ter visto o movimento.

Peri levantou os ombros e metendo as pistolas na cinta passou entre eles com a cabeça alta, o olhar sobranceiro, e acompanhou sua senhora.

 

 

Capítulo XI - No Banho

Descendo a escada de pedras da esplanada Cecília perguntava à sua prima:

—Dize-me uma coisa, Isabel; por que é que tu não falas ao Sr. Álvaro?

Isabel estremeceu.

—Tenho reparado, continuou a menina, que nem mesmo respondes à cortesia que ele nos faz.

 

—Que ele te faz, Cecília, replicou a moça docemente.

—Confessa que não gostas dele. Tens-lhe antipatia?

A moça calou-se.

—Não falas?... olha que então vou pensar outra coisa! continuou Cecília galanteando.

Isabel empalideceu; e levando a mão ao coração para comprimir as pulsações violentas, fez um esforço supremo e arrancou algumas palavras que pareciam queimar-lhe os lábios:

—Bem sabes que o aborreço!...

Cecília não viu a alteração da fisionomia de sua prima, porque tendo chegado à baixa nesse momento, esquecera a conversa, e começara a brincar com uma alegria infantil sobre a relva.

Mas ainda que visse a perturbação da moça e o choque que ela tinha sentido, decerto atribuiria isso a qualquer outro motivo, menos ao verdadeiro.

A afeição que tinha a Álvaro lhe parecia tão inocente, tão natural, que nunca se lembrara que devia um dia passar daquilo que era, isto é, de um prazer que fazia sorrir, e de um enleio que fazia corar.

Esse amor pois, se era amor, não podia conhecer o que se passava na alma de Isabel; não podia compreender a sublime mentira que os lábios da moça acabavam de proferir.

Quanto a Isabel, temendo trair o seu segredo, tinha arrancado do seu coração cheio de amor, essa palavra de ódio, que para ela era quase uma blasfêmia.

Mas antes isso do que revelar o que se passava em sua alma; esse mistério, essa ignorância que envolvia o seu amor, e o escondia a todos os olhos, tinha para ela uma voluptuosidade inexprimível.

Podia assim fitar horas e horas o moço, sem que ele o percebesse, sem o incomodar talvez com a prece muda do olhar suplicante; podia rever-se em sua alma sem que um sorriso de desdém ou de zombaria a fizesse sofrer.

O sol vinha nascendo.

O seu primeiro raio espreguiçava-se ainda pelo céu anilado, e ia beijar as brancas nuvenzinhas que corriam ao seu encontro.

Apenas a luz branda e suave da manhã esclarecia a terra e surpreendia as sombras indolentes que dormiam sob as copas das árvores.

Era a hora em que o cacto, a flor da noite, fechava o seu cálice cheio das gotas de orvalho com que destila o seu perfume, temendo que o sol crestasse a alvura diáfana de suas pétalas.

Cecília com a sua graça de menina travessa corria sobre a relva ainda úmida colhendo uma gracíola azul que se embalançava sobre a haste, ou um malvaísco que abria os lindos botões escarlates.

Tudo para ela tinha um encanto inexprimível; as lágrimas da noite que tremiam como brilhantes das folhas das palmeiras; a borboleta que ainda com as asas entorpecidas esperava o calor do sol para reanimar-se; a viuvinha que escondida na ramagem avisava o companheiro que o dia vinha raiando: tudo lhe fazia soltar um grito de surpresa e de prazer.

Enquanto a menina brincava assim pela várzea, Peri, que a seguia de longe, parou de repente tomado por uma idéia que lhe fez correr pelo corpo um calafrio; lembrara-se do tigre.

De um pulo sumiu-se numa grande moita de arvoredo que se elevava a alguns passos; ouviu-se um rugido abafado, um grande farfalhar de folhas que se espedaçavam, e o índio apareceu.

Cecília tinha-se voltado um pouco trêmula:

—Que é isto, Peri?

—Nada, senhora.

—E assim que prometeste estar quieto?

—Ceci não se há de zangar mais.

—Que queres tu dizer?

—Peri sabe! respondeu o índio sorrindo.

Na véspera tinha provocado uma luta espantosa para domar e vencer um animal feroz, e deitá-lo submisso e inofensivo aos pés da moça, julgando que isso lhe causava um prazer.

Agora estremecendo com o susto que sua senhora podia sofrer, destruíra em um instante essa ação de heroísmo, sem proferir uma palavra que a revelasse. Bastava que ele soubesse o que tinha feito, e o que todos deviam ignorar; bastava que sua alma sentisse o orgulho da nobre dedicação que se expandia no sorriso de seus lábios.

As moças que estavam bem longe de saber até que ponto tinha chegado a loucura de Peri, e que não julgavam possível que um homem pudesse fazer o que ele tinha feito, não compreenderam nem a frase, nem o sorriso.

Cecília tinha chegado a uma latada de jasmineiros que havia à borda dágua, e que lhe servia de casa de banho; era um dos trabalhos do índio, que o havia arranjado com aquele cuidado e esmero que punha em satisfazer as vontades da menina.

Peri já tinha ganho a margem do rio, e estava longe; Isabel sentou-se na relva.

Então afastando as ramas dos jasmineiros que ocultavam inteiramente a entrada, Cecília penetrou naquele pequeno pavilhão de verdura, e examinou se as folhas estavam bem embastidas, se não havia alguma fresta por onde o olhar do dia penetrasse.

A inocente menina tinha vergonha até do raio de luz que podia vir espiar o tesouros de beleza que ocultava a cambraia de suas roupagens.

Assim, foi depois desse exame escrupuloso, e ainda corando de si mesma, que começou o seu vestuário de banho. Mas quando o corpinho da anágua caindo, descobriu suas alvas espáduas e seu colo paro e suave, a menina quase morreu de pejo e de susto. Um passarinho, escondido entre as folhas, um gárrulo travesso e malicioso, gritara distintamente:—Bem-te-vi!

Cecília riu-se do susto que tivera, e acabou o seu vestuário de banho que a cobria toda, deixando apenas nus os braços e o pezinho de menina.

Atirou-se à água como um passarinho; Isabel que a acompanhara por comprazer ficou sentada à beira do rio.

Como Cecília estava bela nadando sobre as águas límpidas da corrente, com seus cabelos louros soltos, e os braços alvos que se curvavam graciosamente para imprimir ao corpo um doce movimento! Parecia uma dessas garças brancas, ou colhereiras de rósea cor que deslizam mansamente à flor do lago, nas tardes serenas, espelhando-se no cristal das águas.

Às vezes a linda menina se deitava de braços e sorrindo ao céu azul ia levada pela corrente; ou perseguia as jaçanãs e marrecas que fugiam diante dela. Outras vezes Peri que estava distante, do lado superior do rio, colhia alguma flor parasita que deitava sobre um barquinho feito de uma casca de pau e que vinha trazido pela correnteza.

A menina perseguia o barquinho a nado, apanhava a flor, e ia oferecê-la na pontinha dos dedos a Isabel, que desfolhando-a tristemente, murmurava as palavras cabalísticas com que o coração procura iludir-se.

Em vez porém de consultar o presente, perguntava o futuro, porque sabia que o presente não tinha esperanças para ela, e se a flor dissesse o contrário mentia.

Havia meia hora que Cecília estava no banho, quando Peri, que colocado sobre uma árvore não deixava de lançar o olhar ao redor de si, viu na margem oposta as guaximas se agitarem.

A ondulação produzida nos arbustos foi-se estendendo como um caracol e aproximando-se do lagar onde a moça se banhava, até que parou detrás de umas grandes pedras que havia à beira do rio.

Do primeiro lanço de olhos o índio conheceu que o largo sulco traçado entre as hastes verdes do arvoredo não podia deixar de ser produzido por um animal de grande corpulência.

Seguiu rapidamente pelos ramos das árvores, atravessou o rio sobre essa ponte aérea, e conseguiu, escondido pelas folhas, colocar-se perpendicularmente ao lagar onde ainda se fazia sentir a oscilação dos arbustos.

Viu então sentados entre as guaximas dois selvagens, mal cobertos por uma tanga de penas amarelas, que com o arco esticado e a flecha a partir, esperavam que Cecília passasse diante da fresta que formavam as pedras para despedirem o tiro.

E a menina descuidada e tranqüila já tinha estendido o braço e ferindo a água passava sorrindo por diante da morte que a ameaçava.

Se se tratasse de sua vida, Peri teria sangue-frio; mas Cecília corria um perigo, e portanto não refletiu, não calculou.

Deixou-se cair como uma pedra do alto da árvore; as duas flechas que partiam, uma cravou-se-lhe no ombro, a outra rogando-lhe pelos cabelos mudou de direção.

Ergueu-se então, e sem mesmo dar-se ao trabalho de arrancar a seta, de um só movimento tomou à cinta as pistolas que tinha recebido de sua senhora, e despedaçou a cabeça dos selvagens.

Ouviram-se dois gritos de susto que partiam da margem oposta, e quase logo a voz trêmula e colérica de Cecília que chamava:

—Peri!...

Ele beijou as pistolas ainda fumegantes e ia responder, quando a dois passos surgiu de entre a touça o vulto de uma índia que sumiu-se ligeiramente no mato.

Enfiou um olhar pela fresta e julgando Cecília já fora do banho e em lugar seguro, lançou-se atrás da índia a que já lhe levava um grande avanço.

Uma larga fita vermelha que escapava da ferida tingia a sua alva túnica de algodão; Peri sentiu-se vacilar de repente e apertou com desespero o coração como para reter o sangue que espadanava.

Foi um momento de luta terrível entre o espírito e a matéria, entre a força da vontade e o poder da natureza.

O corpo desfalecia, os joelhos se dobravam, e Peri erguendo os braços como para agarrar-se à cúpula das árvores, estorcendo os músculos para manter-se em pé, lutava debalde com a fraqueza que se apoderava dele.

Debateu-se um momento contra a poderosa gravitação que o vergava para a terra; mas era homem, e tinha de ceder à lei da criação. Entretanto sucumbindo o valente índio resistia sempre; e vencido parecia querer lutar ainda.

Não caiu, não; quando a força lhe faltou de todo, foi-se lentamente retraindo e tocou a terra com os joelhos.

Mas então lembrou-se de Cecília, de sua senhora a quem tinha de vingar, e para quem devia viver a fim de salvá-la, e de velar sobre ela. Fez um esforço supremo: contraindo-se conseguiu reerguer-se; deu dois passos vacilantes, girou no ar e foi bater de encontro a uma árvore com a qual se abraçou convulsivamente.

Era uma cabuíba de alta grandeza que se elevava pelo cimo da floresta, e de cujo tronco cinzento borbulhava um óleo cor de opala que desfiava em lágrimas.

O suave aroma que recendia dessas gotas fez o índio abrir os olhos amortecidos, que se iluminaram de uma brilhante irradiação de felicidade. Colou ardentemente os lábios no tronco, e sorveu o óleo, que entrou no seu seio como um bálsamo poderoso.

Sentiu-se renascer.

Estendeu o óleo sobre a ferida, estancou o sangue e respirou.

Estava salvo.

 

 

Capítulo XII - A Onça

Voltemos à casa.

Loredano, depois do movimento de Peri, tinha acompanhado com os olhos a Álvaro, o qual seguia pela borda da esplanada para ver Cecília que dirigia-se ao rio.

Apenas o moço dobrou o ângulo que formava o rochedo, o italiano desceu a ladeira rapidamente, e meteu-se pelo mato.

Poucos instantes se tinham passado quando Rui Soeiro apareceu na esplanada, ganhou a baixa, e entranhou-se por sua vez na floresta.

Bento Simões imitou-o com pequeno intervalo, e guiando-se por alguns talhos frescos que viu nas árvores, tomou a mesma direção.

O pátio ficou deserto.

Decorreu cerca de meia hora: a casa tinha aberto todas as suas janelas para receber o ar puro da manhã, e as emanações saudáveis dos campos; um ligeiro penacho de fumo alvadio coroava o tubo da chaminé, anunciando que os trabalhos caseiros haviam começado.

De repente ouviu-se um grito no interior da habitação; todas as portas e janelas do edifício fecharam-se com um estrépito e uma rapidez, como se um inimigo caísse de assalto.

Pela fresta de uma janela entreaberta apareceu o rosto de D. Lauriana, pálida, e com os cabelos sem estarem riçados, o que era uma coisa extraordinária.

—Aires Gomes!... O escudeiro!... Chamem Aires Gomes! Que venha já! gritou a dama.

A janela fechou-se de novo com o ferrolho.

A personagem que já conhecemos pouco tardou, e atravessando a esplanada dirigiu-se à casa, sem compreender a razão por que àquela hora com o sol alto ainda toda a habitação parecia dormir.

—Fizestes-me chamar! disse ele chegando-se à janela.

—Sim; estais armado? perguntou D. Lauriana por detrás da porta.

—Tenho a minha espada; mas que novidade há?

A fisionomia decomposta de D. Lauriana apareceu de novo na fresta da janela.

—A onça!... Aires Gomes! A onça!...

O escudeiro deu um salto prodigioso julgando que o animal de que se falava ia saltar-lhe ao cangote, e sacou da espada pondo-se em guarda.

A dama vendo o movimento do escudeiro supôs que a onça atirava-se à janela, e caiu de joelhos murmurando uma oração ao santo advogado contra as feras.

Alguns minutos se passaram assim; D. Lauriana rezando; e Aires Gomes rodando no pátio como um corrupio, com receio de que a onça não o atacasse pelas costas, o que além de ser uma vergonha para um homem de armas da sua têmpera, seria um pouco desagradável para sua saúde.

Por fim, de pulo em pulo o escudeiro conseguiu ganhar de novo a parede do edifício e encostar-se nela, o que o tranqüilizou completamente; pela frente não havia inimigo que o fizesse pestanejar.

Então batendo com a folha da espada na ombreira da janela disse em voz alta:

—Explicar-me-eis que onça é essa de que falais, Sra. D. Lauriana; ou estou cego, ou não vejo aqui sombra de semelhante animal.

—Estais bem certo disso, Aires Gomes? disse a dama reerguendo-se.

—Se estou certo! Assegurai-vos com os vossos próprios olhos.

—É verdade! Mas em alguma parte há de estar!

—E por que quereis vós à fina força que aqui esteja uma onça, Sra. D. Lauriana? disse o escudeiro um tanto impacientado.

—Pois não sabeis! exclamou a dama.

—O quê, senhora?

—Aquele bugre endemoninhado não se lembrou de trazer ontem uma onça viva para a casa!

—Quem, o perro do cacique?

—E quem mais senão aquele cão tinhoso!

—É das que ele costuma fazer!

—Viu-se já uma coisa semelhante, Aires Gomes!

—Mas a culpa não tem ele!

—Quero ver se o Sr. Mariz ainda teima em guardar essa boa jóia.

—E que é feito da fera, Sra. D. Lauriana?

—Algures deve estar. Procurai-a, Aires; corram tudo, matem-na, e tragam-me aqui.

—É dito e feito, respondeu o escudeiro correndo tanto quanto lhe permitiam as suas botas de couro de raposa.

Com pouca demora cerca de vinte aventureiros armados desceram da esplanada.

Aires Gomes marchava na frente com um enorme chuço na mão direita, a espada na mão esquerda, e uma faca atravessada nos dentes.

Depois de percorrerem quase todo o vale e baterem o arvoredo, voltavam, quando o escudeiro estacou de repente e gritou:

—Ei-la, rapazes! Fogo antes que faça o pulo!

Com efeito, por entre a ramagem das árvores via-se a pele negra e marchetada do tigre e os olhos felinos que brilhavam com o seu reflexo pálido.

Os aventureiros levaram o mosquete à face, mas no momento de puxarem o gatilho, largaram todos uma risada homérica, e abaixaram as armas.

—Que é lá isso? Têm medo?

E o destemido escudeiro sem se importar com os outros, mergulhou por sob as árvores e apresentou-se arrogante em face do tigre.

Aí porém caiu-lhe o queixo de pasmo e de surpresa.

A onça embalava-se a um galho suspensa pelo pescoço e enforcada pelo laço que apertando-se com o seu próprio peso, a estrangulara.

Enquanto viva, um só homem bastara para trazê-la desde o Paraíba até à floresta, onde tinha sido caçada, e da floresta até àquele lugar onde havia expirado.

Era depois de morta que fazia todo aquele espalhafato; que punha em armas vinte homens valentes e corajosos; e produzia uma revolução na casa de D. Lauriana.

Passado o primeiro momento de admiração, Aires Gomes cortou a corda e arrastando o animal foi apresentá-lo à dama.

Depois que de fora lhe asseguraram que o tigre estava bem morto, entreabriu-se a porta, e D. Lauriana ainda toda arrepiada olhou estremecendo o corpo da fera.

—Deixe-o aí mesmo. O Sr. D. Antônio há de vê-lo com seus olhos!

Era o corpo de delito, sobre o qual pretendia basear o libelo acusatório que ia fulminar contra Peri.

Por diferentes vezes a dama tinha procurado persuadir seu marido a expulsar o índio que ela não podia sofrer, e cuja presença bastava para causar-lhe um faniquito.

Mas todos os seus esforços tinham sido baldados; o fidalgo com a sua lealdade e o cavalheirismo apreciava o caráter de Peri, e via nele embora selvagem, um homem de sentimentos nobres e de alma grande. Como pai de família estimava o índio pela circunstância a que já aludimos de ter salvado sua filha, circunstância que mais tarde se explicará.

Desta vez porém, D. Lauriana esperava vencer; e julgava impossível que seu marido não punisse severamente esse crime abominável de um homem que ia ao mato amarrar uma onça e trazê-la viva para casa. Que importava que ele tivesse salvado a vida de uma pessoa, se punha em risco a existência de toda a família, e sobretudo a dela?

Terminava esta reflexão justamente no momento em que D. Antônio de Mariz assomava à porta.

—Dir-me-eis, senhora, que rumor é este, e qual a causa?

—Aí a tendes! exclamou D. Lauriana apontando para a onça com um gesto soberbo.

—Lindo animal! disse o fidalgo adiantando-se e tocando com o pé as presas do tigre.

—Ah! achais lindo! Inda mais achareis quando souberdes quem o trouxe!...

—Deve ter sido um hábil caçador, disse D. Antônio contemplando a fera com esse prazer de montearia que era um dom dos fidalgos daquele tempo: não tem o sinal de uma só ferida!

—E obra daquele excomungado caboclo, Sr. Mariz! respondeu D. Lauriana preparando-se para o ataque.

—Ah! exclamou o fidalgo rindo; é a caça que Peri ontem perseguia, e de que nos falou Álvaro!

—Sim; e que trouxe viva como se fosse alguma paca!

—Ah! trouxe viva! Mas não vedes que é impossível?

—Como impossível se Aires Gomes vem de acabá-la agora mesmo! Aires Gomes quis retrucar; mas a dama impôs-lhe silêncio com um gesto.

O fidalgo curvou-se e segurando o animal pelas orelhas ergueu-o; ao passo que examinava o corpo para ver se lhe descobria alguma bala, notou que tinha as patas e as mandíbulas ligadas.

—É verdade! murmurou ele; devia estar viva há coisa de uma hora; ainda conserva o calor.

D. Lauriana deixou que seu marido se fartasse de contemplar o animal, certa de que as reflexões que esta vista produziria não podiam deixar de ser favorável ao seu plano.

Quando julgou que tinha chegado o momento, deu dois passos, arranjou a cauda do seu vestido, e dando um certo descaído ao corpo, dirigiu-se a D. Antônio:

 

Bom é que vejais, Sr. Mariz, que nunca me iludo! Que de vezes vos hei dito que fazíeis mal em conservar esse bugre? Não queríeis acreditar: tínheis um fraco inexplicável pelo pagão. Pois bem...

A dama tomou um tom oratório e acentuou a palavra com um gesto enérgico apontando para o animal morto:

—Aí tendes o pago. Toda a vossa família ameaçada! Vós mesmo que podíeis sair desapercebido; vossa filha que ignorando o perigo que corria, foi banhar-se, e podia a esta hora estar pasto de feras.

O fidalgo estremeceu à idéia do perigo que correra sua filha e ia precipitar-se; mas ouviu um doce murmúrio de vozes que parecia um chilrear de sais: eram as duas moças que subiam a ladeira.

D. Lauriana sorria-se do seu triunfo.

—E se fosse só isto? continuou ela. Porém não pára aqui: amanhã vereis que nos traz algum jacaré, depois uma cascavel ou uma jibóia; encher-nos-á a casa de cobras e lacraus. Seremos aqui devorados vivos, porque a um bugre arrenegado deu-lhe na cabeça fazer as suas bruxarias!

—Exagerais muito também, D. Lauriana. É certo que Peri fez uma selvajaria; mas não há razão para que receemos tanto. Merece uma reprimenda: lha darei e forte. Não continuará.

—Se o conhecêsseis como eu, Sr. Mariz! É bugre e basta! Podeis ralhar-lhe quanto quiserdes; ele o fará mesmo por pirraça!

—Prevenções vossas, que não partilho.

A dama conheceu que ia perdendo terreno; e resolveu dar o golpe decisivo; amaciou a voz, e tomou um tom choroso.

—Fazei o que vos aprouver! Sois homem, e não tendes medo de nada! Mas eu, continuou arrepiando-se, não poderei mais dormir, só com a idéia de que uma jararaca sobe-me à cama; de dia a todo momento julgarei que algum gato montês vai saltar-me pela janela; que a minha roupa está cheia de lagartas de fogo! Não há forças que resistam a semelhante martírio!

D. Antônio começou a refletir seriamente sobre o que dizia sua mulher, e a pensar no sem-número de faniquitos, desmaios e arrufos que ia produzir o terror pânico justificado pelo fato do índio; contudo conservava ainda a esperança de conseguir acalmá-la e dissuadi-la.

D. Lauriana espiava o efeito do seu último ataque. Contava vencer.

Wednesday, 3 February 2021

Letter from Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki to His Eminence Vincent Cardinal Nichols (in English)

 Eminence,

 

In recent days, public opinion in Poland has been shaken by the decision of the British court to stop giving food and water to a Pole who was hospitalized in Plymouth with a brain injury. In fact, he was sentenced to death by starvation.

The man’s wife and children, who live in England, agreed with the decision. But the opposite are the mother and sister living in Poland and the man’s other sister and niece, living in England. However, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has repeatedly refused their complaint, which allows the hospital to continue the procedure to deprive this man of his life. 

The authorities of our country assured that they would cover the costs of treatment and transport. The British court does not agree to transport the patient as the journey may be life-threatening.

St. John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae wrote: „It is possible to speak in a certain sense of a war of the powerful against the weak: a life which would require greater acceptance, love and care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden, and is therefore rejected in one way or another. A person who, because of illness, handicap or, more simply, just by existing, compromises the well-being or life-style of those who are more favoured tends to be looked upon as an enemy to be resisted or eliminated. In this way a kind of „conspiracy against life” is unleashed. This conspiracy involves not only individuals in their personal, family or group relationships, but goes far beyond, to the point of damaging and distorting, at the international level, relations between peoples and States” (EV, 12).

I turn to Your Eminence – as the President of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales – asking for your help in this difficult matter and to undertake steps towards saving the life of our compatriot.

 

Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki

President of the Polish Bishops’ Conference

Vice-President of the Council of Bishops’ Conferences of Europe (CCEE)

Tuesday, 2 February 2021

Tuesday’s Serial: “On War” by General Carl von Clausewitz (Translated into English by Colonel J.J. Graham) – XXXVI

CHAPTER XIII - Manœuvring

1. We have already touched upon this subject in the thirtieth chapter of the sixth book. It is one which concerns the defence and the attack in common; nevertheless it has always in it something more of the nature of the offensive than the defensive. We shall therefore now examine it more thoroughly.

2. Manœuvring is not only the opposite of executing the offensive by force, by means of great battles; it stands also opposed to every such execution of the offensive as proceeds directly from offensive means, let it be either an operation against the enemy’s communications, or line of retreat, a diversion, etc., etc.

3. If we adhere to the ordinary use of the word, there is in the conception of manœuvring an effect which is first produced, to a certain extent, from nothing, that is, from a state of rest or equilibrium through the mistakes into which the enemy is enticed. It is like the first moves in a game of chess. It is, therefore, a game of evenly-balanced powers, to obtain results from favourable opportunity, and then to use these as an advantage over the enemy.

4. But those interests which, partly as the final object, partly as the principal supports (pivot) of action, must be considered in this matter, are chiefly:—

 

(a.) The subsistence from which it is our object to cut off the enemy, or to impede his obtaining.

(b.) The junction with other corps.

(c.) The threatening other communications with the interior of the country, or with other armies or corps.

(d.) Threatening the retreat.

(e.) Attack of isolated points with superior forces

 

These five interests may establish themselves in the smallest features of detail belonging to any particular situation; and any such object then becomes, on that account, a point round which everything for a time revolves. A bridge, a road, or an entrenchment, often thus plays the principal part. It is easy to show in each case that it is only the relation which any such object has to one of the above interests which gives it importance.

 

(f.) The result of a successful manœuvre, then, is for the offensive, or rather for the active party (which may certainly be just as well the defensive), a piece of land, a magazine, etc.

(g.) In a strategic manœuvre two converse propositions appear, which look like different manœuvres, and have sometimes served for the derivation of false maxims and rules, and have four branches, which are, however, in reality, all necessary constituents of the same thing, and are to be regarded as such. The first antithesis is the surrounding the enemy, and the operating on interior lines; the second is the concentration of forces, and their extension over several posts.

(h.) As regards the first antithesis, we certainly cannot say that one of its members deserves a general preference over the other; for partly it is natural that action of one kind calls forth the other as its natural counterpoise, its true remedy; partly the enveloping form is homogeneous to the attack, but the use of interior lines to the defence; and therefore, in most cases, the first is more suitable to the offensive side, the latter to the defensive. That form will gain the upper hand which is used with the greatest skill.

(i.) The branches of the other antithesis can just as little be classed the one above the other. The stronger force has the choice of extending itself over several posts; by that means he will obtain for himself a convenient strategic situation, and liberty of action in many respects, and spare the physical powers of his troops. The weaker, on the other hand, must keep himself more concentrated, and seek by rapidity of movement to counteract the disadvantage of his inferior numbers. This greater mobility supposes greater readiness in marching. The weaker must therefore put a greater strain on his physical and moral forces,—a final result which we must naturally come upon everywhere if we would always be consistent, and which, therefore, we regard, to a certain extent, as the logical test of the reasoning. The campaigns of Frederick the Great against Daun, in the years 1759 and 1760, and against Laudon, 1761, and Montecuculis against Turenne in 1673, 1675, have always been reckoned the most scientific combinations of this kind, and from them we have chiefly derived our view.

(j.) Just as the four parts of the two antitheses above supposed must not be abused by being made the foundation of false maxims and rules, so we must also give a caution against attaching to other general relations, such as base, ground, etc., an importance and a decisive influence which they do not in reality possess. The smaller the interests at stake, so much the more important the details of time and place become, so much the more that which is general and great falls into the background, having, in a certain measure no place in small calculations. Is there to be found, viewed generally, a more absurd situation than that of Turenne in 1675, when he stood with his back close to the Rhine, his army along a line of three miles in extent, and with his bridge of retreat at the extremity of his right wing? But his measures answered their object, and it is not without reason that they are acknowledged to show a high degree of skill and intelligence. We can only understand this result and this skill when we look more closely into details, and judge of them according to the value which they must have had in this particular case.

 

We are convinced that there are no rules of any kind for strategic manœuvring; that no method, no general principle can determine the mode of action; but that superior energy, precision, order, obedience, intrepidity in the most special and trifling circumstances may find means to obtain for themselves signal advantages, and that, therefore, chiefly on those qualities will depend the victory in this sort of contest.

 

 

CHAPTER XIV - Attack on Morasses, Inundations, Woods

Morasses, that is, impassable swamps, which are only traversed by a few embankments, present peculiar difficulties to the tactical attack, as we have stated in treating of the defence. Their breadth hardly ever admits of the enemy being driven from the opposite bank by artillery, and of the construction of a roadway across. The strategic consequence is that endeavours are made to avoid attacking them by passing round them. Where the state of culture, as in many low countries, is so great that the means of passing are innumerable, the resistance of the defender is still strong enough relatively, but it is proportionably weakened for an absolute decision, and, therefore, wholly unsuitable for it. On the other hand, if the low land (as in Holland) is aided by inundations, the resistance may become absolute, and defy every attack. This was shown in Holland in the year 1672, when, after the conquest and occupation of all the fortresses outside the margin of the inundation, 50,000 French troops became available, who,—first under Condé and then under Luxemburg,—were unable to force the line of inundation, although it was only defended by about 20,000 men. The campaign of the Prussians, in 1787, under the Duke of Brunswick, against the Dutch, ended, it is true, in a quite contrary way, as these lines were then carried by a force very little superior to the defenders, and with trifling loss; but the reason of that is to be found in the dissensions amongst the defenders from political animosities, and a want of unity in the command, and yet nothing is more certain than that the success of the campaign, that is, the advance through the last line of inundation up to the walls of Amsterdam depended on a point of such extreme nicety that it is impossible to draw any general deduction from this case. The point alluded to was the leaving unguarded the Sea of Haarlem. By means of this, the Duke turned the inundation line, and got in rear of the post of Amselvoen. If the Dutch had had a couple of armed vessels on this lake the duke would never have got to Amsterdam, for he was “au bout de son latin.” What influence that might have had on the conclusion of peace does not concern us here, but it is certain that any further question of carrying the last line of inundation would have been put an end to completely.

The winter is, no doubt, the natural enemy of this means of defence, as the French have shown in 1794 and 1795, but it must be a severe winter.

Woods, which are scarcely passable, we have also included amongst the means which afford the defence powerful assistance. If they are of no great depth then the assailant may force his way through by several roads running near one another, and thus reach better ground, for no one point can have any great tactical strength, as we can never suppose a wood as absolutely impassable as a river or a morass.—But when, as in Russia and Poland, a very large tract of country is nearly everywhere covered with wood, and the assailant has not the power of getting beyond it, then, certainly, his situation becomes very embarrassing. We have only to think of the difficulties he must contend with to subsist his army, and how little he can do in the depths of the forest to make his ubiquitous adversary feel his superiority in numbers. Certainly this is one of the worst situations in which the offensive can be placed.

 

 

CHAPTER XV - Attack on a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision

Most of the subjects have been already touched upon in the sixth book, and by their mere reflection, throw sufficient light on the attack.

Moreover, the conception of an enclosed theatre of war, has a nearer relation to the defence than to the attack. Many of the leading points, the object of attack, the sphere of action of victory, etc., have been already treated of in that book, and that which is most decisive and essential on the nature of the attack, cannot be made to appear until we get to the plan of war: still there remains a good deal to say here, and we shall again commence with the campaign, in which a great decision is positively intended.

 

1. The first aim of the attack is a victory. To all the advantages which the defender finds in the nature of his situation, the assailant can only oppose superior numbers; and, perhaps, in addition, the slight advantage which the feeling of being the offensive and advancing side gives an army. The importance of this feeling, however, is generally overrated; for it does not last long, and will not hold out against real difficulties. Of course, we assume that the defender is as faultless and judicious in all he does as the aggressor. Our object in this observation is to set aside those vague ideas of sudden attack and surprise, which, in the attack, are generally assumed to be fertile sources of victory, and which yet, in reality, never occur except under special circumstances. The nature of the real strategic surprise, we have already spoken of elsewhere.—If, then, the attack is inferior in physical power, it must have the ascendancy in moral power, in order to make up for the disadvantages which are inherent in the offensive form; if the superiority in that way is also wanting, then there are no good grounds for the attack, and it will not succeed.

2. As prudence is the real genius of the defender, so boldness and self-confidence must animate the assailant. We do not mean that the opposite qualities in each case may be altogether wanting, but that the qualities named have the greatest affinity to the attack and defence respectively. These qualities are only in reality necessary because action in war is no mere mathematical calculation; it is activity which is carried on if not in the dark, at all events in a feeble twilight, in which we must trust ourselves to the leader who is best suited to carry out the aim we have in view.—The weaker the defender shows himself morally, the bolder the assailant should become.

3. For victory, it is necessary that there should be a battle between the enemy’s principal force and our own. This is less doubtful as regards the attack than in regard to the defence, for the assailant goes in search of the defender in his position. But we have maintained (in treating of the defensive) that the offensive should not seek the defender out if he has placed himself in a false position, because he may be sure that the defender will seek him out, and then he will have the advantage of fighting where the defender has not prepared the ground. Here all depends on the road and direction which have the greatest importance; this is a point which was not examined in the defence, being reserved for the present chapter. We shall, therefore, say what is necessary about it here.

4. We have already pointed out those objects to which the attack should be more immediately directed, and which, therefore, are the ends to be obtained by victory; now, if these are within the theatre of war which is attacked, and within the probable sphere of victory, then the road to them is the natural direction of the blow to be struck. But we must not forget that the object of the attack does not generally obtain its signification until victory has been gained, and therefore the mind must always embrace the idea of victory with it; the principal consideration for the assailant is, therefore, not so much merely to reach the object as to reach it a conqueror; therefore the direction of his blow should be not so much on the object itself as on the way which the enemy’s army must take to reach it. This way is the immediate object of the attack. To fall in with the enemy before he has reached this object, to cut him off from it, and in that position to beat him—to do this is to gain an intensified victory.—If, for example, the enemy’s capital is the object of the attack, and the defender has not placed himself between it and the assailant, the latter would be wrong in marching direct upon the capital, he would do much better by taking his direction upon the line connecting the defender’s army with the capital, and seeking there the victory which shall place the capital in his hands.

If there is no great object within the assailant’s sphere of victory, then the enemy’s line of communication with the nearest great object to him is the point of paramount importance. The question, then, for every assailant to ask himself is, If I am successful in the battle, what is the first use I shall make of the victory? The object to be gained, as indicated by the answer to this question, shows the natural direction for his blow. If the defender has placed himself in that direction, he has done right, and there is nothing to do but to go and look for him there. If his position is too strong, then the assailant must seek to turn it, that is, make a virtue of necessity. But if the defender has not placed himself on this right spot, then the assailant chooses that direction, and as soon as he comes in line with the defender, if the latter has not in the mean time made a lateral movement, and placed himself across his path, he should turn himself in the direction of the defender’s line of communication in order to seek an action there; if the defender remains quite stationary, then the assailant must wheel round towards him and attack him in rear.

Of all the roads amongst which the assailant has a choice, the great roads which serve the commerce of the country are always the best and the most natural to choose. To avoid any very great bends, more direct roads, even if smaller, must be chosen, for a line of retreat which deviates much from a direct line is always perilous.

5. The assailant, when he sets out with a view to a great decision, has seldom any reason for dividing his forces, and if, notwithstanding this, he does so, it generally proceeds from a want of clear views. He should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front as will admit of their all coming into action together. If the enemy himself has divided his forces, so much the better for the assailant, and to preserve this further advantage small demonstrations should be made against the enemy’s corps which have separated from the main body; these are the strategic fausses attaques; a detachment of forces for this purpose would then be justifiable.

Such separation into several columns as is indispensably necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form, for that form is natural to the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason. But it must be only of a tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment when a great blow takes place, is a complete waste of power. It can only be excused when the assailant is so strong that there can be no doubt at all about the result.

6. But the attack requires also prudence, for the assailant has also a rear, and has communications which must be protected. This service of protection must be performed as far as possible by the manner in which the army advances, that is, eo ipso by the army itself. If a force must be specially detailed for this duty, and therefore a partition of forces is required, this cannot but naturally weaken the force of the blow itself.—As a large army is always in the habit of advancing with a front of a day’s march at least in breadth, therefore, if the lines of retreat and communication do not deviate much from the perpendicular, the covering of those lines is in most cases attained by the front of the army.

Dangers of this description, to which the assailant is exposed, must be measured chiefly by the situation and character of the adversary. When everything lies under the pressure of an imminent great decision, there is little room for the defender to engage in undertakings of this description; the assailant has, therefore, in ordinary circumstances not much to fear. But if the advance is over, if the assailant himself is gradually passing into the defensive, then the covering of the rear becomes every moment more necessary, becomes more a thing of the first importance. For the rear of the assailant being naturally weaker than that of the defender, therefore the latter, long before he passes over to the real offensive, and even at the same time that he is yielding ground, may have commenced to operate against the communications of the assailant.

 

 

CHAPTER XVI - Attack on a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision

1. Although there is neither the will nor the power sufficient for a great decision, there may still exist a decided view in a strategic attack, but it is directed against some secondary object. If the attack succeeds, then, with the attainment of this object the whole falls again into a state of rest and equilibrium. If difficulties to a certain extent present themselves, the general progress of the attack comes to a standstill before the object is gained. Then in its place commences a mere occasional offensive or strategic manœuvring. This is the character of most campaigns.

2. The objects which may be the aim of an offensive of this description are:—

(a.) A strip of territory; gain in means of subsistence, perhaps contributions, sparing our own territory, equivalents in negotiations for peace—such are the advantages to be derived from this procedure. Sometimes an idea of the credit of the army is attached to it, as was perpetually the case in the wars of the French Marshals in the time of Louis XIV. It makes a very important difference whether a portion of territory can be kept or not. In general, the first is the case only when the territory is on the edge of our own theatre of war, and forms a natural complement of it. Only such portions come into consideration as an equivalent in negotiating a peace, others are usually only taken possession of for the duration of a campaign, and to be evacuated when winter begins.

(b.) One of the enemy’s principal magazines. If it is not one of considerable importance, it can hardly be looked upon as the object of an offensive determining a whole campaign. It certainly in itself is a loss to the defender, and a gain to the assailant; the great advantage, however, from it for the latter, is that the loss may compel the defender to retire a little and give up a strip of territory which he would otherwise have kept. The capture of a magazine is therefore in reality more a means, and is only spoken of here as an object, because, until captured, it becomes, for the time being, the immediate definite aim of action.

(c.) The capture of a fortress.—We have made the siege of fortresses the subject of a separate chapter, to which we refer our readers. For the reasons there explained, it is easy to conceive how it is that fortresses always constitute the best and most desirable objects in those offensive wars and campaigns in which views cannot be directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy or the conquest of an important part of his territory. We may also easily understand how it is that in the wars in the Low Countries, where fortresses are so abundant, everything has always turned on the possession of one or other of these fortresses, so much so, that the successive conquests of whole provinces never once appear as leading features; while, on the other hand, each of these strong places used to be regarded as a separate thing, which had an intrinsic value in itself, and more attention was paid to the convenience and facility with which it could be attacked than to the value of the place itself.

At the same time, the attack of a place of some importance is always a great undertaking, because it causes a very large expenditure; and, in wars in which the whole is not staked at once on the game, this is a matter which ought to be very much considered. Therefore, such a siege takes its place here as one of the most important objects of a strategic attack. The more unimportant a place is, or the less earnestness there is about the siege, the smaller the preparations for it, the more it is done as a thing en passant, so much the smaller also will be the strategic object, and the more it will be a service fit for small forces and limited views; and the whole thing then often sinks into a kind of sham fight, in order to close the campaign with honour, because as assailant it is incumbent to do something.

(d.) A successful combat, encounter, or even battle, for the sake of trophies, or merely for the honour of the arms, sometimes even for the mere ambition of the commanders. That this does happen no one can doubt, unless he knows nothing at all of military history. In the campaigns of the French during the reign of Louis XIV., the most of the offensive battles were of this kind. But what is of more importance for us is to observe that these things are not without objective value, they are not the mere pastime of vanity; they have a very distinct influence on peace, and therefore lead as it were direct to the object. The military fame, the moral superiority of the army and of the general, are things, the influence of which, although unseen, never ceases to bear upon the whole action in war.

The aim of such a combat of course presupposes; (a) that there is an adequate prospect of victory, (b) that there is not a very heavy stake dependent on the issue.—Such a battle fought in straitened relations, and with a limited object, must naturally not be confounded with a victory which is not turned to profitable account merely from moral weakness.

3. With the exception of the last of these objects (d) they may all be attained without a combat of importance, and generally they are so obtained by the offensive. Now, the means which the assailant has at command without resorting to a decisive battle, are derived from the interests which the defensive has to protect in his theatre of war; they consist, therefore, in threatening his lines of communications, either through objects connected with subsistence, as magazines, fertile provinces, water communications, etc., or important points (bridges, defiles, and such like,) or also by placing other corps in the occupation of strong positions situated inconveniently near to him and from which he cannot again drive us out; the seizure of important towns, fertile districts, disturbed parts of the country, which may be excited to rebellion, the threatening of weak allies, etc., etc. Should the attack effectually interrupt the communications, and in such a manner that the defender cannot re-establish them but at a great sacrifice, it compels the defender to take up another position more to the rear or to a flank to cover the objects, at the same time giving up objects of secondary importance. Thus a strip of territory is left open; a magazine or a fortress uncovered: the one exposed to be overrun, the other to be invested. Out of this, combats greater or less may arise, but in such case they are not sought for and treated as an object of the war but as a necessary evil, and can never exceed a certain degree of greatness and importance.

4. The operation of the defensive on the communications of the offensive, is a kind of reaction which in wars waged for the great solution, can only take place when the lines of operation are very long; on the other hand, this kind of reaction lies more in accordance with the nature of things in wars which are not aimed at the great solution. The enemy’s lines of communication are seldom very long in such a case; but then, neither is it here so much a question of inflicting great losses of this description on the enemy, a mere impeding and cutting short his means of subsistence often produces an effect, and what the lines want in length is made up for in some degree by the length of time which can be expended in this kind of contest with the enemy: for this reason, the covering his strategic flanks becomes an important object for the assailant. If, therefore, a contest (or rivalry) of this description takes place between the assailant and defender, then the assailant must seek to compensate by numbers for his natural disadvantages. If he retains sufficient power and resolution still to venture a decisive stroke against one of the enemy’s corps, or against the enemy’s main body itself, the danger which he thus holds over the head of his opponent is his best means of covering himself.

5. In conclusion, we must notice another great advantage which the assailant certainly has over the defender in wars of this kind, which is that of being better able to judge of the intentions and force of his adversary than the latter can in turn of his. It is much more difficult to discover in what degree an assailant is enterprising and bold than when the defender has something of consequence in his mind. Practically viewed, there usually lies already in the choice of the defensive form of war a sort of guarantee that nothing positive is intended; besides this, the preparations for a great reaction differ much more from the ordinary preparations for defence than the preparations for a great attack differ from those directed against minor objects. Finally, the defender is obliged to take his measures soonest of the two, which gives the assailant the advantage of playing the last hand.

 

 

CHAPTER XVII ‘ Attack on Fortresses

The attack on fortresses cannot of course come before us here in its aspect as a branch of the science of fortification or military works; we have only to consider the subject, first, in its relation to the strategic object with which it is connected; secondly, as regards the choice among several fortresses; and thirdly, as regards the manner in which a siege should be covered.

That the loss of a fortress weakens the defence, especially in case it forms an essential part of that defence; that many conveniences accrue to the assailant by gaining possession of one, inasmuch as he can use it for magazines and depôts, and by means of it can cover districts of country cantonments, etc.; that if his offensive at last should have to be changed into the defensive, it forms the very best support for that defensive—all these relations which fortresses bear to theatres of war, in the course of a war, make themselves sufficiently evident by what has been said about fortresses in the book on the Defence, the reflection from which throws all the light required on these relations with the attack.

In relation to the taking of strong places, there is also a great difference between campaigns which tend to a great decision and others. In the first, a conquest of this description is always to be regarded as an evil which is unavoidable. As long as there is yet a decision to be made, we undertake no sieges but such as are positively unavoidable. When the decision has been already given—the crisis, the utmost tension of forces, some time passed—and when, therefore, a state of rest has commenced, then the capture of strong places serves as a consolidation of the conquests made, and then they can generally be carried out, if not without effort and expenditure of force, at least without danger. In the crisis itself the siege of a fortress heightens the intensity of the crisis to the prejudice of the offensive; it is evident that nothing so much weakens the force of the offensive, and therefore there is nothing so certain to rob it of its preponderance for a season. But there are cases in which the capture of this or that fortress is quite unavoidable, if the offensive is to be continued, and in such case a siege is to be considered as an intensified progress of the attack; the crisis will be so much greater the less there has been decided previously. All that remains now for consideration on this subject belongs to the book on the plan of the war.

In campaigns with a limited object, a fortress is generally not the means but the end itself; it is regarded as a small independent conquest, and as such has the following advantages over every other:—

1. That a fortress is a small, distinctly-defined conquest, which does not require a further expenditure of force, and therefore gives no cause to fear a reaction.

2. That in negotiating for peace, its value as an equivalent may be turned to account.

3. That a siege is a real progress of the attack, or at least seems so, without constantly diminishing the force like every other advance of the offensive.

4. That the siege is an enterprise without a catastrophe.

The result of these things is that the capture of one or more of the enemy’s strong places, is very frequently the object of those strategic attacks which cannot aim at any higher object.

The grounds which decide the choice of the fortress which should be attacked, in case that may be doubtful, generally are—

(a) That it is one which can be easily kept, therefore stands high in value as an equivalent in case of negotiations for peace.

(b) That the means of taking it are at hand. Small means are only sufficient to take small places; but it is better to take a small one than to fail before a large one.

(c) Its strength in engineering respects, which obviously is not always in proportion to its importance in other respects. Nothing is more absurd than to waste forces before a very strong place of little importance, if a place of less strength may be made the object of attack.

(d) The strength of the armament and of the garrison as well. If a fortress is weakly armed and insufficiently garrisoned, its capture must naturally be easier; but here we must observe that the strength of the garrison and armament, are to be reckoned amongst those things which make up the total importance of the place, because garrison and armaments are directly parts of the enemy’s military strength, which cannot be said in the same measure of works of fortification. The conquest of a fortress with a strong garrison can, therefore, much more readily repay the sacrifice it costs than one with very strong works.

(e) The facility of moving the siege train. Most sieges fail for want of means, and the means are generally wanting from the difficulty attending their transport. Eugene’s siege of Landreci, 1712, and Frederick the Great’s siege of Olmütz, 1758, are very remarkable instances in point.

(f) Lastly, there remains the facility of covering the siege as a point now to be considered.

There are two essentially different ways by which a siege may be covered: by entrenching the besieging force, that is, by a line of circumvallation, and by what is called lines of observation. The first of these methods has gone quite out of fashion, although evidently one important point speaks in its favour, namely, that by this method the force of the assailant does not suffer by division exactly that weakening which is so generally found a great disadvantage at sieges. But we grant there is still a weakening in another way, to a very considerable degree, because—

1. The position round the fortress, as a rule, is of too great extent for the strength of the army.

2. The garrison, the strength of which, added to that of the relieving army, would only make up the force originally opposed to us, under these circumstances is to be looked upon as an enemy’s corps in the middle of our camp, which, protected by its walls, is invulnerable, or at least not to be overpowered, by which its power is immensely increased.

3. The defence of a line of circumvallation admits of nothing but the most absolute defensive, because the circular order, facing outwards, is the weakest and most disadvantageous of all possible orders of battle, and is particularly unfavourable to any advantageous counter-attacks. There is no alternative, in fact, but to defend ourselves to the last extremity within the entrenchments. That these circumstances may cause a greater diminution of the army than one-third which, perhaps, would be occasioned by forming an army of observation, is easy to conceive. If, added to that, we now think of the general preference which has existed since the time of Frederick the Great for the offensive, as it is called, (but which, in reality, is not always so) for movements and manœuvres, and the aversion to entrenchments, we shall not wonder at lines of circumvallation having gone quite out of fashion. But this weakening of the tactical resistance is by no means its only disadvantage; and we have only reckoned up the prejudices which forced themselves into the judgment on the lines of circumvallation next in order after that disadvantage, because they are nearly akin to each other. A line of circumvallation only in reality covers that portion of the theatre of war which it actually encloses; all the rest is more or less given up to the enemy if special detachments are not made use of to cover it, in which way the very partition of force which it was intended to obviate takes place. Thus the besieging army will be always in anxiety and embarrassment on account of the convoys which it requires, and the covering the same by lines of circumvallation, is not to be thought of if the army and the siege supplies required are considerable, and the enemy is in the field in strong force, unless under such conditions as are found in the Netherlands, where there is a whole system of fortresses lying close to each other, and intermediate lines connecting them, which cover the rest of the theatre of war, and considerably shorten the lines by which transport can be affected. In the time of Louis the Fourteenth the conception of a theatre of war had not yet bound itself up with the position of an army. In the Thirty Years’ War particularly, the armies moved here and there sporadically before this or that fortress, in the neighbourhood of which there was no enemy’s corps at all, and besieged it as long as the siege equipment they had brought with them lasted, and until an enemy’s army approached to relieve the place. Then lines of circumvallation had their foundation in the nature of circumstances.

In future it is not likely they will be often used again, unless where the enemy in the field is very weak, or the conception of the theatre of war vanishes before that of the siege. Then it will be natural to keep all the forces united in the siege, as a siege by that means unquestionably gains in energy in a high degree.

The lines of circumvallation in the reign of Louis XIV., at Cambray and Valenciennes, were of little use, as the former were stormed by Turenne, opposed to Condé, the latter by Condé opposed to Turenne; but we must not overlook the endless number of other cases in which they were respected, even when there existed in the place the most urgent need for relief; and when the commander on the defensive side was a man of great enterprise, as in 1708, when Villars did not venture to attack the allies in their lines at Lille. Frederick the Great at Olmütz, 1758, and at Dresden, 1760, although he had no regular lines of circumvallation, had a system which in all essentials was identical; he used the same army to carry on the siege, and also as a covering army. The distance of the Austrian army induced him to adopt this plan at Olmütz, but the loss of his convoy at Domstädtel made him repent it; at Dresden in 1760 the motives which led him to this mode of proceeding, were his contempt for the German States’ imperial army, and his desire to take Dresden as soon as possible.

Lastly, it is a disadvantage in lines of circumvallation, that in case of a reverse it is more difficult to save the siege train. If a defeat is sustained at a distance of one or more days’ march from the place besieged, the siege may be raised before the enemy can arrive, and the heavy trains may, in the mean time, gain also a day’s march.

In taking up a position for an army of observation, an important question to be considered is the distance at which it should be placed from the besieged place. This question will, in most cases, be decided by the nature of the country, or by the position of other armies or corps with which the besiegers have to remain in communication. In other respects, it is easy to see that, with a greater distance, the siege is better covered, but that by a smaller distance, not exceeding a few miles, the two armies are better able to afford each other mutual support.

 

 

CHAPTER XVIII - Attack on Convoys

The attack and defence of a convoy form a subject of tactics: we should, therefore, have nothing to say upon the subject here if it was not necessary, first, to demonstrate generally, to a certain extent, the possibility of the thing, which can only be done from strategic motives and relations. We should have had to speak of it in this respect before when treating of the defence, had it not been that the little which can be said about it can easily be framed to suit for both attack and defence, while at the same time the first plays the higher part in connection with it.

A moderate convoy of three or four hundred wagons, let the load be what it may, takes up half a mile, a large convoy is several miles in length. Now, how is it possible to expect that the few troops usually allotted to a convoy will suffice for its defence? If to this difficulty we add the unwieldy nature of this mass, which can only advance at the slowest pace, and which, besides, is always liable to be thrown into disorder, and lastly, that every part of a convoy must be equally protected, because the moment that one part is attacked by the enemy, the whole is brought to a stop, and thrown into a state of confusion, we may well ask,—how can the covering and defence of such a train be possible at all? Or, in other words, why are not all convoys taken when they are attacked, and why are not all attacked which require an escort, or, which is the same thing, all that come within reach of the enemy? It is plain that all tactical expedients, such as Templehof’s most impracticable scheme of constantly halting and assembling the convoy at short distances, and then moving off afresh: and the much better plan of Scharnhorst, of breaking up the convoy into several columns, are only slight correctives of a radical evil.

The explanation consists in this, that by far the greater number of convoys derive more security from the strategic situation in general, than any other parts exposed to the attacks of the enemy, which bestows on their limited means of defence a very much increased efficacy. Convoys generally move more or less in rear of their own army, or, at least, at a great distance from that of the enemy. The consequence is, that only weak detachments can be sent to attack them, and these are obliged to cover themselves by strong reserves. Added to this the unwieldiness itself of the carriages used, makes it very difficult to carry them off; the assailant must therefore, in general, content himself with cutting the traces, taking away the horses, and blowing up powder-wagons, by which the whole is certainly detained and thrown into disorder, but not completely lost; by all this we may perceive, that the security of such trains lies more in these general relations than in the defensive power of its escort. If now to all this we add the defence of the escort, which, although it cannot by marching resolutely against the enemy directly cover the convoy, is still able to derange the plan of the enemy’s attack; then, at last, the attack of a convoy, instead of appearing easy and sure of success, will appear rather difficult, and very uncertain in its result.

But there remains still a chief point, which is the danger of the enemy’s army, or one of its corps, retaliating on the assailants of its convoy, and punishing it ultimately for the undertaking by defeating it. The apprehension of this, puts a stop to many undertakings, without the real cause ever appearing; so that the safety of the convoy is attributed to the escort, and people wonder how a miserable arrangement, such as an escort, should meet with such respect. In order to feel the truth of this observation, we have only to think of the famous retreat which Frederick the Great made through Bohemia after the siege of Olmütz, 1758, when the half of his army was broken into a column of companies to cover a convoy of 4,000 carriages. What prevented Daun from falling on this monstrosity? The fear that Frederick would throw himself upon him with the other half of his army, and entangle him in a battle which Daun did not desire; what prevented Laudon, who was constantly at the side of that convoy, from falling upon it at Zischbowitz sooner and more boldly than he did? The fear that he would get a rap over the knuckles. Ten miles from his main army, and completely separated from it by the Prussian army, he thought himself in danger of a serious defeat if the king, who had no reason at that time to be concerned about Daun, should fall upon him with the bulk of his forces.

It is only if the strategic situation of an army involves it in the unnatural necessity of connecting itself with its convoys by the flank or by its front that then these convoys are really in great danger, and become an advantageous object of attack for the enemy, if his position allows him to detach troops for that purpose. The same campaign of 1758 affords an instance of the most complete success of an undertaking of this description, in the capture of the convoy at Domstädtel. The road to Neiss lay on the left flank of the Prussian position, and the king’s forces were so neutralised by the siege and by the corps watching Daun, that the partizans had no reason to be uneasy about themselves, and were able to make their attack completely at their ease.

When Eugene besieged Landrecy in 1712, he drew his supplies for the siege from Bouchain by Denain; therefore, in reality, from the front of the strategic position. It is well known what means he was obliged to use to overcome the difficulty of protecting his convoys on that occasion, and in what embarrassments he involved himself, ending in a complete change of circumstances.

The conclusion we draw, therefore, is that however easy an attack on a convoy may appear in its tactical aspect, still it has not much in its favour on strategic grounds, and only promises important results in the exceptional instances of lines of communication very much exposed.